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“Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational 
and joint nature of Alliance missions.” 
NATO strategic Concept (2010) 
 
 
“There is no such entity as an international soldier” 
Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (2006) 
 
 
“No sensible person would choose cooperation as a topic of 
investigation on the grounds that its puzzles could readily be 
solved”. 
Robert E. Keohane, After Hegemony (2005) 
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Abstract  
International Defence Cooperation (IDC) is often presented as one of the solutions to the 
budgetary problems western European states face when maintaining their armed forces. IDC 
is a defensive strategy, chosen by lack of other options. In reality, IDC is as much a problem 
as it can be a solution. This thesis investigates if the need to uphold national sovereignty and 
a lack of international trust are among the factors that hamper states to come to more and 
closer cooperation and how this mechanism influences international defence cooperation.  
After a short analysis of the nature of problems in IDC, the role of trust and 
sovereignty is explored in three different ways. First, nine cases of IDC are investigated by 
analyzing the treaties, MoU’s and agreements that formalize these multinational initiatives. 
Secondly, interviews were conducted with officers working at ministerial and defence staff 
level. Third, theory from the field of international relations was studied to assess if the 
findings on IDC are in line with theory from other fields of international cooperation. 
Most West-European states accept the necessity of IDC. However, effective 
cooperation is not possible without giving up, at least parts of, national influence and 
sovereignty. Governments are reluctant to do so, since they wish to maintain control over 
their armed forces. One reason is domestic political accountability for military actions. The 
second reason is that governments cannot fully trust each other. They can be forced to change 
earlier decisions on cooperation or be changed themselves. States therefore wish to maintain 
flexibility and autonomy in their cooperation and avoid dependence on other states. This 
leads to suboptimal organization of international cooperation and multinational units. 
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Summary 
International Defence Cooperation (IDC) is often presented as the new solution for an 
old problem. Most European states are not able to maintain a complete and balanced national 
defence organization. Flat or decreasing budgets, combined with increasing costs of 
equipment and personnel, lead to restructuring and downsizing. This problem has however 
existed for many years, and so has the thought of closer cooperation on defence issues in 
order to achieve savings and synergetic effects. In reality, IDC is a difficult process and there 
is no overarching plan or roadmap to steer the dozens of binational or multinational 
initiatives, resulting in a complex and diffuse structures, overlapping and interrelated 
initiatives and competition for influence. 
This thesis investigates if a lack of international trust and the need for upholding 
national sovereignty can explain limitations and problems of IDC, and if other factors have 
to be taken into account. After a preliminary analyses of problems related to IDC, the 
founding documents of nine existing cases of IDC were analysed in order to establish to 
which extent states are willing to give up control over their armed forces in favour of 
international cooperation. Interviews were conducted in order to achieve insight in the role of 
trust and the mechanisms leading to IDC. Thirdly, the findings were placed in the theoretical 
perspective of International Relations theory on international cooperation.   
 The document analysis indicates that states need mechanisms or guarantees to control 
the balance between sovereignty and dependency. More recent agreements contain clauses 
and articles allowing states to withdraw or to abstain from participation. Sovereignty is a key 
factor in military cooperation with other states. Interviews connected the factors of trust and 
sovereignty to domestic political accountability. Governments are responsible for the 
decision to use military power and the actions of their military forces. In non-existential 
conflicts these decisions are often disputed domestically or politically controversial.  
Democratic governments depend on popular support. Decisions on the use of military force 
are strictly national decisions and should not be the result of international obligations. 
 As a result, IDC projects are organized in a way that each nation can decide to pull 
out or abstain from participation in certain actions. This mechanism prohibits specialization 
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and the economy of scale that could be achieved if states were really willing to trust each 
other. In other words: sovereignty comes at the price of less efficiency. Vice versa: increased 
multinational effect and efficiency means that states have to be willing to give up parts of 
their independence.  
 Trust has a second role when discussing multinationality of armed forces. In order to 
achieve their missions in dangerous situations, military at all levels have to be able to trust 
each other. When states impose caveats on operations in order to limit the risk either for the 
soldiers, or for the domestic support to the mission, they restrict the freedom of movement of 
their forces. The willingness and ability to share risks is however an important factor to build 
up trust among military forces of different nations. This psychological mechanism has 
implications for organizing IDC. The military have to be able and willing to cooperate with 
their partners for IDC to be sustainable and effective. Theory from the field of International 
Relations supports the empirical findings and the relation between cooperation, dependence 
and trust.  
What are the consequences for IDC? Firstly, one should be modest regarding 
expectations of IDC. When states choose IDC as a means to uphold their defence capability, 
they have to realize it comes at a price. States, and thus governments, aspiring IDC have to 
be willing to accept compromises and become dependant on other states. Secondly, it is 
possible to come to effective forms of IDC, but it means building flexibility into IDC, for 
example by organizing multinational units in modules. Such a solution does however reduce 
the synergetic effects of cooperating internationally  
International defence cooperation is still considered a second choice compared to 
national solutions. There is a political scepticism towards IDC, since it means compromising 
and losing parts of sovereignty. In absence of alternatives, states will have to find a way to 
cooperate and trust each other. To achieve successful IDC, a state depends on a reputation as 
trustworthy and politically reliable partner. Trust is built by bottom-up acceptance and 
willingness to share risks. Top down, trust is mainly built by reliability and successful 
previous cooperation. Trust can be a catalyst, leading to synergetic effects in multinational 
cooperation. The absence or breach of trust is difficult to overcome and hard to compensate.  
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1. Introduction 
Many European states will in future not be able to maintain a complete and balanced 
national defence organization. International defence cooperation (IDC) seems to be the new 
miracle drug for the suffering western defence community. By closer cooperation in the 
development and purchase of equipment, huge savings will be realized. States can 
supplement each others’ defence capabilities and collective solutions will also allow smaller 
states access to strategic transport and high-tech weapons. IDC will lead to increased output 
on a smaller budget. At least, that is what visionary leaders and European ministers of 
defence tell us.  
Grete Faremo, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, recently stated that: “Increasingly, 
we acknowledge that most countries are no longer able to uphold a full range of military 
capabilities. This invites increased multilateral cooperation, to derive new strength from 
mutual efforts” (Faremo, 2011b). Yet, if this form of cooperation is so logical and will 
deliver such excellent results, why was it not done years before? Why have states been so 
hesitant and why have the many material initiatives hardly ever delivered satisfactory 
equipment in time?  
Today’s armed forces, especially in Europe, are already more internationally 
orientated and organized than ever before (Ulriksen, 2007). Despite this internationalization, 
politicians as well as academics still claim that IDC is dysfunctional, that it leads to 
disappointing results and a duplication of defence assets (Solana, 2003). Furthermore, IDC 
initiatives can be perceived as competition for existing security organizations like NATO 
(Petersson, 2010).  
IDC seems to be surrounded by contradictory views and opposing opinions. Why is 
IDC in practice so difficult? Is it possible that a lack of trust and the necessity for sovereignty 
in practice are the limiting factors for further integration and cooperation? The statements by 
the French President Nicholas Sarkozy and the British Prime-minister David Cameron on the 
occasion of the recent resumption of the Anglo-French defence cooperation give reason to 
believe so. This initiative, aiming at practical defence cooperation at various levels, shows 
that even two of the biggest states in Europe can not maintain their defence structures 
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nationally. Both saw themselves forced to defend the initiative against critics. David 
Cameron says that: “It is about defending our national interest. It is about practical, hard-
headed cooperation between two sovereign countries.” (Burns, 2010). On the same occasion 
Sarkozy declared that this agreement shows “a level of trust and confidence between our two 
nations which is unequalled in history.” (ibid.).  
Sovereignty and trust apparently play an important role when states consider defence 
cooperation, but do we really trust another state? How important is it to be sovereign and 
independent? Is this in line with what can be expected using theory from international 
relations (IR)? And which impact does this have for defence cooperation? This thesis will 
analyse empirically and theoretically how far trust and sovereignty influence IDC, and if 
other factors have to be taken into account as well. If a lack of trust and the requirement for 
sovereignty negatively influence IDC, the implications could be serious. The armed forces’ 
task of serving the state by maintaining its sovereignty would prevent deeper international 
integration, a better use of resources and better defence cooperation in general. Could it be 
that IDC is at root unnatural, leading to equivocal solutions or ambiguity? 
This thesis builds on the rather non-controversial premise that armed forces first and 
foremost answer to their national state authority. “…each [officer] remains linked to his or 
her paymasters at home. The more senior the officer, the more must the national link be 
expected to be open and working” , Sir Rupert Smith wrote when describing multinational 
planning and cooperation (Smith, 2006, p. 314). If states really do not fully trust each other 
and sovereignty is more important than effecting cooperation, this should be visible in 
current forms of cooperation. The empirical part consists of a descriptive analysis of 
founding-documents in nine cases of defence cooperation and interviews with four high-
ranking officers responsible for implementing IDC at ministerial and defence staff level.  
Subsequently, the findings will be compared to theory on international cooperation 
from the field of International Relations (IR). Within IR, questions regarding state interest, 
security, conflict, competition and cooperation between states are studied from multiple 
perspectives. Can existing theory from IR contribute to explaining how trust and sovereignty 
influence IDC? Answering this question could contribute to explaining the findings, place 
them in a political perspective and assess the potential for generalization. 
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1.1 Research question and scope of the thesis 
This thesis is based on two assumptions. Firstly, IDC as it is conducted today does not 
deliver to the expectations of its full potential. Secondly, armed forces serve foremost their 
own state. Using these two starting points, the following questions will be investigated: 
Can a lack of international trust and the need for upholding national sovereignty explain 
limitations and problems of International Defence Cooperation? Do other factors have 
to be taken into account? 
The following sub-questions will be used to investigate the research question and place the 
findings in an International Relations perspective? 
− Is IDC really a problem area?  
− Do documents concerning cases of IDC show how far states trust each other?  
− What effect do trust and sovereignty have on defence cooperation? 
− Which other factors could explain limitations in IDC? 
− Are the findings in line with existing theory from IR and do they have a more general 
value for IDC? 
− What are the consequences for defence cooperation in general? 
 
The intent is to explore the effects that the need for sovereignty and trust have on defence 
cooperation. These effects should be better recognizable at the lower service and unit levels, 
where less political influence is present. Hence, it will be necessary to look into the military 
organizations at a deeper level than the top level which is usually discussed when addressing 
cooperation between states, as at NATO level. Therefore forms of cooperation at the 
“service” level, between armies, navies and air forces from different states will be explored. 
The research is limited to forms of cooperation in peace-time, although the traditional 
difference between peace and conflict seems to be weakening during the operations currently 
being conducted. Second, this is not a study of states’ behaviour considering military 
operations (Ad Bellum) or already at war (In Bello). It is not a study of coalitions conducting 
military operations, but a study of states and armed forces preparing to do so. 
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The third limitation concerns the cases that were studied. Only Norwegian and Dutch 
officers were interviewed and the cases were limited to those where at least Norway or the 
Netherlands were a partner. The majority of the cases include both. The research is limited to 
western states; more specifically states within NATO or the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
related to NATO. Finally, this is not a historical study: all the cases are actual current 
partnerships or forms of cooperation. Some are even still in the prepatory phase1. 
1.2 Outline  
This thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter one introduces the problem, 
presents the research question, the build up, limitations and the reasons to apply a theoretic 
perspective from IR. Chapter two will present the methodology used for the research. 
Chapter three discusses IDC and civil-military relations. It gives reasons for the assumptions 
that IDC is a problem area and that there is a close relation between the military and political 
aspects.  
Chapter four first presents which mechanisms states use to regulate trust and sovereignty 
in defence cooperation, followed by an analysis of written sources like terms of reference 
(ToR), memoranda of understanding (MoU) and treaties of IDC projects in order to establish 
the presence or absence of these mechanisms. 
Chapter five presents the results from interviews with leading military officers 
responsible for implementing IDC, with the intent of completing the documented 
information. Chapter six presents theory from IR on international cooperation in order to 
establish the relevance in a more general perspective on international cooperation and assess 
the potential for generalization. Finally the conclusions will be presented in chapter seven.  
1.3 International Defence Cooperation & International Relations theory  
There are numerous factors that influence success or failure in complicated areas like 
IDC. One could analyze IDC from the management side or the cultural side. Why choose 
                                              
1
 The Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Hungary, intended to operate C-17 strategic transport airplanes, was established in 
2008 and the first aircraft was delivered on 27 July 2009. 
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trust and sovereignty and use international relations as main tool to study it? The most 
straightforward way would be to make a comparison of IDC projects and analyze what went 
well and what went wrong. The question would be by which criteria. Furthermore, most 
involved are not interested in documenting and discussing failure and everyone has his own 
definition of success. Therefore such an approach would be cumbersome and probably not 
achievable within the available timeframe. Furthermore the scope of such a multidisciplinary 
study would be too large. It is therefore necessary to choose a different approach. The choice 
to use IR theory is made for of several reasons.  
Trust and sovereignty have been studied within the field of IR studies on state 
behaviour. Military services act on behalf of their states. When the military work 
internationally, one can therefore reasonably assume that the mechanisms of IR will be 
visible between military services as well. Second, the close relation between military and 
their state gives reason to believe that the outcome or effects of IDC are not likely to exceed 
what the state “allows”. Inversely: however smart, beneficial and well managed an 
international military project might be; if it breaks with fundamental rules of national and 
international political logic it will not succeed. It is therefore so that one will have to 
establish if IDC is likely to be subordinated to the same logic as international relations in 
general? If so, one also has to investigate the issue of optimizing results and the chances for 
success.  
 A third argument to investigate IDC through the lens of international relations is the 
increase of internationalization and the attempts to achieve a further integration in Europe. 
The efforts to come to a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the 
enlargement of NATO with new member states, both lead to an enhancement of interaction 
at the military level.  Frédéric Mérand describes this as “…a political revolution which forces 
us to rethink the national state-armed forces nexus and more broadly the interplay of national 
identity and the state” (Mérand, 2008). Using IR theory, we might be able to analyze what 
implications the attempts for deepening political integration will have for the armed forces, 
and vice versa which political conditions have to be met for military integration to succeed. 
 The increasing multinationality during NATO- and other missions is a fourth 
argument for looking at military cooperation from an international relations angle. On the 
ground, in the air and at sea, military forces from dozens of nations work together on a day 
by day basis. Amongst the effects will be a bottom-up acceptance, appreciation and increase 
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of multinationality, as officers rise through the ranks2. A significant change has occurred in 
this area during the last decade.  
Previously, countries contributed to missions with relatively autonomous force 
packages, in “national” areas of responsibility, own support and procedures. With the 
increase of distance and costs, and the simultaneous reduction of the defence forces in 
Europe, more and more states revert to smaller contributions, which consequently work with 
military from different countries at a lower level. Instead of contributing with a complete 
army field hospital one now can find situations where a patient is transported by an 
American helicopter, treated by a German surgical team and nursed by Lithuanians in a 
Dutch managed field hospital guarded by the Afghan National Army. Multinationality has 
become a fact of life at all levels of military operations. It is hard to imagine such 
cooperation when these soldiers do not trust each other.  
 IDC is perceived by many as a problematic field. At best it is difficult to achieve 
concrete results. Simultaneously, many have high expectations of IDC and present it as an 
inevitable future prospect. Insights and knowledge from IR can probably explain at least 
some of the problems. Within IR, trust and sovereignty are factors known to restrict, or at 
least strongly influence, the effects of cooperation between states. Achieving insight in how 
sovereignty and trust influence IDC can therefore serve two purposes: it can explain some of 
the problems in IDC and secondly it can help to assess how far IR theory can be used to 
analyse IDC.  
 
                                              
2
 MG M. de Kruif, Royal Netherlands Army 
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2. Methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the main methodological considerations in the 
study. Section 2.1 contains a brief overview of the research design. Section 2.2 addresses the 
used literature and data analyses. In 2.3 the main considerations regarding the interviews will 
be presented, while section 2.4 discusses the analysis and evaluation of the collected data. 
Finally I will discuss my own role and its relevance for this study in section 2.5. 
2.1 Research design 
This study uses a qualitative deductive approach as described by Jacobsen (Jacobsen, 2005) 
and is of a qualitative nature. It starts with the personal observation that international defence 
cooperation in itself seems very logical, but often does not deliver the expected results. 
Theory on more general cooperation between states as described in international relations 
theory might deliver an explanation for this. In order to select relevant theory and focus the 
study, a broad research question and a set of sub-questions were formulated, which guided 
the collection of data (Creswell, 2009). 
 One of the risks connected to this approach is that one only looks after for that 
confirms the expectations. In order to avoid this, two methods of data collection have been 
used: official documents and interviews. During the interviews the research question as such 
was not explicitly named or discussed. Some of the questions during the interviews had 
elements from the research question as a theme, but the interviews were deliberately set up 
and conducted very broadly.  
The study is structured in three main steps. First, two assumptions have to be 
justified: IDC often does not deliver its full potential and military serve first and foremost 
their own state. The second step is to investigate trust and sovereignty in official documents 
and with interviews with high ranking officers responsible for coordinating IDC. Third, the 
findings are related to the relevant mechanisms and dynamics from international relations 
theory. In this way the relevance and the potential for generalization of the findings will be 
assessed. 
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2.2 Written sources 
This study is based on academic literature, official documents and documented interviews. 
As often with an exploratory study, not much scientific literature has been written on the 
topic itself (Creswell, 2009, p. 26). Preliminary study indicates that at least part of IR 
literature can also be used to explain phenomena in the different, but related field of IDC. 
Own experience working in international defence cooperation has triggered curiosity 
regarding trust, sovereignty and their effect on IDC. Within IR theory, these two factors are 
recognized as two important factors in the relations between states. 
Which academic literature one chooses the basis has a profound impact on the study, 
especially in a deductive research design. IDC concerns cooperation as well as competition. 
Furthermore, especially studying IDC between NATO countries, one is often confronted with 
the presence of a big partner, the US. On other occasions, similar sized states cooperate 
without a dominating partner. For these reasons I have chosen to use theory from three main 
schools within IR: Realism, Liberalism and International Society3. 
Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realistic Theory of International Politics intends to establish 
general patterns in the behaviour of states. Although written in 1979, it is still seen by many 
as a cornerstone work on the relations between states. Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony 
presents a more liberalist view of international cooperation in absence of a dominant partner 
and finally, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler represent the third school within IR; 
International Society.  
 The documents analysed are the “founding documents” of nine forms of IDC. They 
come in the form of international treaties, Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), Technical 
Agreements (TA) or bilateral documents without specific status. With the exception of 
certain commercial parts4, the documents are public and unrestricted. The most recent 
available versions have been used.  
                                              
3
 Jackson and Sørensen also recognize a fourth school within IR: International Political Economy (IPE). The single sided 
focus on economic relations and welfare makes this school less suited to analyse defence cooperation.  
4
 Parts of the SAC / C-17 MoU are restricted for commercial reasons 
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The studied documents do not provide insight into failed initiatives or projects of 
IDC. They are therefore not representative of all attempts or initiatives regarding potential 
IDC. In order to compensate for this, a second method and second set of data were necessary. 
This was realized by interviewing four high-ranking officers working with IDC at defence 
staff and ministerial level.  
2.3 Interviews 
The intent of the interviews was twofold: they provide general insight in the field of IDC and 
give a second source of data besides the document analyses. This enables confirmation, 
differentiation or negation of the findings from first analyses as described by Jacobsen 
(Jacobsen, 2005, p. 229). Furthermore, interviews provide the possibility for more in depth 
insight into the mechanisms behind IDC and potentially offer new views.  
The decision to interview four high ranking officers working in the defence staffs and 
ministries of Norway and the Netherlands was made for practical as well as methodological 
reasons. Through existing channels or previous encounters they could be approached without 
going through too many formalities. Furthermore, these officers all bear responsibility for 
implementing IDC or are highly qualified because of experience, and could therefore be 
expected to be able to provide valuable in depth information, also into cases that did not lead 
to formal cooperation. Only military officers were interviewed; no civilians. This can be 
perceived as a limitation. 
Three of the four interviews were conducted according to an interview protocol 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 183). This resulted in very open interviews. On occasion the questions 
were formulated in the form of controversial statements to which the interviewees were 
requested to react. One officer preferred to give a briefing, followed by a discussion. Three 
of the four interviews were recorded and transcribed. One officer did not accept the use of a 
dictaphone. Two of the interviewees requested insight in the transcription. One officer 
denied publication in the original form because of the possibility of misquotation or abuse of 
statements made during the interview.  
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2.4 Collection, evaluation and analysis of the data 
The collected data have not been interpreted previously and were collected for the purpose of 
this project. They can therefore be categorized as primary sources (Jacobsen, 2005). For the 
analyses of the “founding documents” the most recent and updated versions have been used. 
Nine projects, partnerships or initiatives of IDC were analyzed. The analysis of the 
documents focussed on a small number of factors related to trust, sovereignty and autonomy. 
The documents themselves provide only very limited insight into the decision-making that 
has lead to the cooperation. They present only the final result.  
 The interviews, primary data, offered the possibility for an in-depth insight into the 
mechanisms behind IDC. In this way they compensate for the lack of in-depth insight from 
the studied documents and contribute to a validation of the results. The interviews were 
structured to determine the mechanisms behind IDC and to discover which roles the factors 
of trust and sovereignty play. The analysis of the interviews was conducted by categorizing 
the answers in a matrix (Creswell, 2009, p. 219). Relevant quotes and answers were grouped 
according to the questions that were developed to answer the research (sub) questions. 
The different purposes of the documental analyses and the interviews, as well as the 
fact that they investigate different data, are the reasons for presenting the findings according 
to the source and method.  
2.5 Own role and views during the research 
I have been involved in IDC for several years and have borne responsibility for forming and 
the implementation of the cooperation between the Norwegian and Netherlands’ armies. This 
has had an effect on this study. Firstly it has influenced the choice of the subject and the 
desire to explain why it can be difficult on occasion to implement something that on first 
glance seems so logical. Secondly it has helped to gain access to the interviewees.  
 As a result, the example of the Dutch-Norwegian cooperation was frequently used 
during the interviews; especially the topic of the failed “package deal” was cited by all 
interviewed, when the role of trust was discussed. Although this example is used during this 
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study, it has not received extra value or meaning, since it was probably a result of my own 
background.   
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3. Background  
The intent of this chapter is to achieve insight in IDC and especially the challenges it faces. 
Using a model from the Norwegian Defence Staff5, I will address IDC from three angles: 
security policy, economic and military. In this way a wider background will be created 
against which the narrower focus on trust and sovereignty will be placed in perspective. 
Secondly, this background chapter will address the relation between armed forces and 
the state. What is the role of armed forces? Which political implications does 
internationalization have and what are the consequences for IDC?  
3.1 International Defence Cooperation: What is the problem?  
Defence cooperation has existed for many years. Defence staffs and ministries have 
developed methods and structures to manage this international cooperation and the many 
influences affecting it. The model in use with the Norwegian Defence Staff illustrates which 
factors influence IDC, by grouping factors into those related to defence and security policy, 
to economic factors and to military requirements. This section will discuss all three and 
present examples from practice. 
 
                                              
5
 This model was presented by MG Knutsen, Adviser International Engagement, from the Norwegian Defence Staff.  
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3.1.1 Defence and Security Policy 
The first group of factors is related to a states’ defence and security policy. In order to 
cooperate successfully, a shared view on the security situation will be very beneficial. 
However, this is not always so.  
The change from a bipolar world to one of multi-polarity after the implosion of the 
Warsaw Pact has had substantial effects on the military and on the ways they cooperate. The 
stability provided by the Cold War provided a background against which coalitions were able 
to optimize their capabilities. However, at the level of the forces themselves, nations 
operated independently (King, 2010).  
The reorientation of the US after 9/11 and the absence of an existential threat changed 
the nature of military cooperation towards an effort to maintain a credible defence capability. 
“As a result of strategic and budgetary pressures, forces now cooperate with each other at the 
lowest tactical levels while on operations; multinational battle groups and even companies 
have become commonplace.” (King, 2010, p. 52). Still, states perceive the changes in the 
security situation in different ways. These differences have an impact on the doctrine, 
structure and modus operandi of the armed forces of the respective countries.  
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In cases where military power was employed, it was in “wars of choice”, not in “wars 
of necessity” (Osinga & Lindley-French, 2010). Some states have therefore chosen to 
organize their defence forces for mainly expeditionary tasks, while others have a general 
domestic emphasis. Even within the Nordic region, an area seemingly homogenous for many, 
security perceptions differ substantially according to Håkon Lunde Saxi:  
“There is, however, no shared Nordic view on ‘hard security’ issues in the Nordic 
region itself, which suggests that a joint security and defence regime aiming at 
something close to a Nordic alliance may find it hard to succeed.” (Saxi, 2011, p. 4) 
These domestic perceptions influence the way states shape their security policy. This 
contributes to creating dilemmas concerning the role, equipment and main task of the 
defence organizations. Other domestic factors, like local employment, protection of national 
defence industry and national pride can enhance this process. 
Not only the strategic environment, but also the way the military operate has changed 
substantially since the end of the cold war. (Matlary & Østerud, 2007). Especially the 
Western military have increasingly been involved in operations other than traditional war. 
Furthermore the environments and the countries in which military forces operate, as well as 
the intended outcome of their actions have changed significantly (Smith, 2006) 6. These 
changes in operational patterns and locations of conflict have had a profound impact on the 
security policy of states and also on IDC.  
More complex tasks are conducted, often deeply integrated with military form other 
nations. This does not only affect on the lower tactical levels. It also requires more 
international consultation and coordination at the political, the strategic and the operational 
levels. (Matlary & Østerud, 2007). 
3.1.2 Economic factors 
Within the used model, the second angle to look at IDC is from an economic 
perspective. IDC is often cited as one of the ways to achieve budget savings. Politicians as 
well as military services say that international cooperation will lead to a better output, or 
                                              
6
 Although Smith himself describes this book as “an interpretation rather than an academic monograph”, it has gained the 
status of a standard-work concerning the employment of military power.. 
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lower national costs. This view was also stated by the Norwegian former Chief of Defence 
Sverre Diesen (Diesen, 2010). IDC is considered for potential budget savings not only in 
Norway. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence has recently conducted a study into IDC with 
the sole intention of saving money7. 
Under certain circumstances IDC probably can lead to a more efficient use of defence 
spending. It is however not a given that IDC will have this effect. The following paragraphs 
will discuss the difficulties related to defence planning and achieving economy of scale by 
IDC. 
Defence planning and defence budgets 
In 2009, the countries of Europe spent around 260 billion Euros on defence (SIPRI, 
2010). This huge sum is however composed of all the national defence budgets and includes 
huge overlaps. States do not seem to be prepared for radical solutions like the functional 
division of tasks when it comes to security and defence, although discussions have been 
ongoing since the seventies. States claim they want to achieve a better use of resources by 
coordinating their defence spending, but simultaneous want to keep central elements under 
national control. The current Norwegian strategic defence concept describes this very 
accurate:  
“Multinational military cooperation is [therefore] considered as a crucial instrument 
to develop and ensure the defence capability of the Norwegian Armed Forces. At the 
same time, it is important to ensure national control over crucial operational 
capabilities…” (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2009) 
 
States wish to have control over critical capabilities nationally. Critical capabilities 
are quite often among the most expensive capabilities8. The increasing costs of acquiring and 
maintaining defence equipment, combined with decreasing budgets, will lead to a situation 
where smaller states can only afford very small defence forces and will lack substantial 
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 The responsible officer, Cdre. Sijtsma, is one of the interviewed for this study. 
8
 Command and control systems, intelligence systems, advanced weapon systems, etc.  
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structural elements9. The alternative would be to have less national control, but to have it 
over a substantial larger and balanced international organized defence force10.  
The defence planning process is dysfunctional. “European states, especially small and 
medium-sized states, stand to lose if this bottom-up process continues” (Matlary & Østerud, 
2007). A top-down approach would however mean that states would loose control over parts 
of their defence spending and seems highly unlikely without a form of political integration 
and combined decision making.  
Efforts to come to a better, more efficient organization and tuning of defence budgets 
within the EU and NATO has been going on for years, although without great success 
(Wogau, 2003). Also individual states have undertaken a number of initiatives, like the 
example of France and Britain described earlier. The global economic recession of 2008 has 
even put more stress on the already tight defence budgets in many more European states, but 
this has not lead to drastic changes in the organization of armed forces like role 
specialization or complete abolition of services by states.  
Materiel cooperation: expectations of economy of scale. 
Multinational development and purchase of defence equipment is often named as a 
way to save money11. Official Norwegian governmental policy states that the highest savings 
can be expected if countries develop their operational capabilities towards system-likeness 
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2009).  
In practice this has proven to be very difficult. States are very keen to protect their 
defence industry and respective defence materiel organizations still intend to procure mainly 
nationally. Despite more progressive forces, seeing the potential benefit of opening the 
international market, states can still ignore the Maastricht Treaty rules on a single market and 
competition when it comes to the “…production of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
materials.” (Merrit, 2003, p. 235). 
                                              
9
 Examples of this are the abolition of maritime patrol aircraft or  main battle tanks (The Netherlands) or the lack of air 
defence units in the Norwegian Army 
10 Based on an interview with Brigadier Solberg, Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 
11 Information MG Knutsen 
 26 
A second mechanism that could lead to savings is cooperation on the development of 
new defence equipment. This can be achieved by producing larger numbers of similar 
equipment and smart solutions for maintenance12. However, countries that embarked on 
developing multinational products face problems like inadequate performance, delays in 
production or excessive increase in price. Other problems include a lack of standardization, 
different doctrines leading to different demands on equipment, the protection of national 
developed knowledge etc. Furthermore, in order to jointly purchase military equipment, all 
partners have to be in the same phase in time13. No one is willing to replace expensive 
equipment when it is still functional and economical to use it.  
The project to develop a new NATO helicopter, the NH-9014, will illustrate some of 
the problems. The project started in 1985. France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom jointly intended to develop a NATO battlefield transport and anti-
ship/anti-submarine helicopter. The delivery of the helicopter was delayed by several years. It 
turned out to be more expensive than expected and does not deliver the expected results. And 
although the NH-90 is considered by some a success with more than 500 ordered worldwide, 
the original reasons to develop the helicopter multinationally, interoperability, lowering unit 
costs and reduction of life cycle costs, did not materialize (Uiterwijk & Kappert, 2010). 
In 2008, after strong oppositional pressure, the Dutch State secretary for Defence Jack 
de Vries atmitted to the Dutch parliament that “....de samenwerking tussen Europese 
industrieën en de partnerlanden weerbarstiger is dan op het eerste oog lijkt.."15 (Staten-
Generaal, 2008). Also in Norway the repeated delays have caused increased costs for 
maintaining the predecessor of the NH-90 longer than intended. The original contract 
foresaw delivery between 2005 and 2008. The first NH-90, for testing purposes only, was 
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 A large part of the costs of new defence equipment are developing costs. Increasing the numbers will therefore lead to 
lower development costs per item. Maintenance can be organized more efficient, for example by having only one in stead of 
several locations.  
13
 Interview with MG Knutsen 
14
 NH-90  Multinationally developed “NATO” helicopter 
15
 …that the collaboration between European industries and the partner nations is more difficult than it appears 
at first glance.  Translation by author 
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however not delivered before the end of 2010. (Finansdepartementet, 2010) and the first 
“production-helicopter” is expected in spring 2011 (Hannestad, 2011).   
Notwithstanding occasional successes, like the materiel F-16 cooperation within the 
European Participating Air Forces (EPAF), or the international pooling of gas-turbines for 
helicopters16, the development of common equipment is very hard and in practice it is 
difficult to achieve financial or operational benefit17. 
3.1.3 Military requirements 
The third source of influence on IDC in the model relates to military requirements. Often the 
military are the ones confronted with the task of putting IDC into effect. The first important 
precondition to achieve the effects of IDC is trust, which shall be discussed first. Secondly, 
the sustainability of IDC will be discussed, since international cooperation is often a matter 
of many years and long lasting projects. Finally there will have to be a clear added value in 
the cooperation, not in the least for those that actually have to conduct it. 
Trust 
The use of armed force is usually seen a means of last resort, and only justified when no 
other tools, like consultation, diplomacy or economic sanctions have worked. Military power 
is the states’ final resort (Johansen & Staib, 2009). This means also that military 
organizations have to be able to face and manage high risks when employed. This does not 
only bring high personal risk to those working in the armed forces, but it also means that 
high stakes are at risk when a state decides to use the military.  
Military organisations are so-called “high reliability organizations”. Literature on 
high reliability organizations emphasizes the creation of a culture of reliability within the 
operating units (Bijlsma, Bogenrieder, & Baalen, 2010). During operations, military of 
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 Idem 
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 In order to achieve real synergy one also has to be willing to accept equipment that is “good enough” and not necessarily 
want “the best or perfect”. Development of too many different versions of the same vehicle, ship or other system will lead 
to loosing the synergetic effects of producing and buying larger numbers. During the development of the “NATO-frigate”, 
which was intended to become a standard naval vessel in use with eight nations, arguments arose concerning the usability, 
the types of weaponry, the design etc. In the end the original thought of common development and achieving economies of 
scale were left and all countries pursued their own programmes. 
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different countries do not, or hardly, meet before they actually find themselves in operational 
situations. Becoming effective requires multinational partnering and building up trust. This is 
a time-consuming and difficult process for which the necessary time is not always available.  
“Organizations and people often tend to trust their partners on the grounds of 
previous experiences or reputation. When partners, for instance, can rely on a 
trustworthy reputation or satisfactory and pleasant cooperation in the past, it is likely 
that they will trust their partner in future situations. A lack of experience or a bad 
reputation, on the contrary, may negatively influence the level of trust partners have 
in each other. Experience and reputation, or the lack thereof, therefore seem to 
determine the initial positions of alliance partners” (Bogers, Dijk, & Heeren-Bogers, 
2010, p. 165). 
When states decide to cooperate on defence in a long term, the military have to be 
able to trust the partners with different nationalities, since their lives may depend on it (King, 
2010). Special attention has to be given to political limitations of military freedom of action. 
Political caveats can limit the military freedom of action, which again leads to loss of trust 
and frustration at working level18. 
Sustainability and added value 
Structural IDC in practice has to be sustainable over long periods and the benefits of the 
cooperation have to outweigh involved extra costs. A complicating factor is often that the 
costs can be easily measured and quantified while the benefits of the cooperation can be very 
hard to measure. How does one for example quantify increased interoperability with the 
armed forces of a partner? Or how does one measure the effect of an additional officer in a 
NATO staff?  
Expectations of benefit need to constantly outweigh short term costs and scepticism. 
If defence units are tasked to participate in an international project but do not experience 
sufficient benefits themselves, the cooperation is not likely to survive since the unit will 
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gradually loose interest and not give priority to the task19. The cost-structure of implementing 
IDC is an important factor to consider when planning and implementing IDC. 
Interoperability 
Military operations require many different sorts of capabilities and units. Very few states are 
still able to operate completely independently and provide a complete force-package. 
Countries therefore have to be able to deliver complementary contributions, so that the total 
force can be effective. Units from different nations have to be interoperable when it comes to 
communications and command and control. Interoperability is however more than 
implementing technical solutions. It also requires cultural interoperability with elements like 
a common doctrine, language and will to cooperate. Creating such interoperability is a 
lengthy process and a commitment for years (Mérand, 2008). Choosing structural partners 
makes interoperability easier, but reduces flexibility. 
The decision to be interoperable with forces of a different state is usually a choice the 
smaller partner makes, in order to become interoperable with a bigger partner. It is more a 
matter of adapting than coming to real cooperation. Interoperability as such therefore does 
not necessarily lead to immediate savings. It might even cost more to become interoperable, 
which is an impeding factor especially when the expectation of IDC is that it will lead to 
savings.  
Interoperability can also lead to choosing specific equipment, like choosing a 
common fighter plane. Such equipment is often in use for decades. Choosing partners for 
interoperability is therefore a long term choice and has to be closely linked to the foreign and 
security policy of a country. 
3.1.4 The positive side 
IDC is not all about problems and failure. In the last decades, military forces from 
various nations have cooperated well during numerous missions by NATO, EU or the UN. 
Air forces of several NATO members flew integrated missions over former Yugoslavia, 
                                              
19
 The position for a Norwegian officer stationed at the Swedish defence college was cancelled because of this reason, 
despite the intent as formulated in the NORDEFCO agreement. 
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multinational naval units have conducted many missions in the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Indian Ocean and currently 47 nations contribute to ISAF20. At the technical and tactical 
level soldiers find solutions to “make it work”. Major-General Mart de Kruif, who 
commanded the Regional Command in southern Afghanistan for a year, described it in the 
following way: “…at the technical level, in operations, we crossed all the existing lines of 
cooperation”. When soldiers have to cooperate, they can. At the technical and tactical level 
multinational cooperation has become a fact of life for the majority of the soldiers and 
officers. 
3.1.5 IDC: a preliminary conclusion 
IDC is often presented as a solution to national capability-shortfalls, a way to save 
budgets or to increase collective security. Using the model as presented by the Norwegian 
defence staff, three viewpoints: security policy considerations, military requirements and 
economic factors, were used to achieve insight in the problems connected to IDC. The track 
record of IDC can be described as “mixed” at best. IDC is not the simple, quick-fix, solution 
as it is sometimes presented. 
Political diverging views on security in practice can hinder integration and 
coordination. They lead to different main efforts, discord on defence planning and the 
multiplication of capabilities. IDC is often named as possibility to achieve economic benefits 
in procurement of equipment. In reality it is however difficult to achieve savings and practice 
lags behind the expectations. Higher development- and transaction costs, diverging views on 
equipment and the protection of national defence industries are among the hampering factors. 
As a result, projects are delayed, turn out to more expensive, do not deliver the necessary 
quality or partners withdraw from the project. 
The military requirements are the third factor taken into account. Soldiers have to be 
confident with the increased multinationality. They literally have to trust their colleagues, 
since their lives and the accomplishment of their mission can depend on it. Furthermore there 
has to be an expectation of an added value within a reasonable timeframe.  
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Military of multiple nations seem to be able to manage multinationality during 
operations quite well. At the tactical level they find solutions or ways around problems 
caused by their different nationalities. This gives reason to assume that persistent factors 
limiting or hampering IDC have to be present at the political or strategic military level. 
3.2 Civil-Military relations 
This study relates defence cooperation to international state behaviour. Although 
most consider it normal that military act on behalf of a state authority, it is necessary to look 
at the relation between the state and its armed forces. What is the nature of this relation and 
what are the consequences of internationalization for control over the armed forces? 
3.2.1 The Sovereign and the Sword 
Very few states do not have an army or form of armed forces (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003). 
Why they so important? The world is anarchic; no higher worldly power exists above the 
state. In order to protect themselves and enforce their rights, states can make use of force and 
therefore need armed forces. In his concept of the “social contract” the seventeenth century 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes describes how the people trade “liberty for safety”. In order to 
avoid chaos, conflict and war, people transfer the right of governing themselves to the 
sovereign (Born & Metselaar, 2010). The sovereign has the duty to maintain law and order 
internally and to defend the state against foreign intrusion. The sovereign is also the 
“supreme commander of the army” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011).  
Today, as they have done for centuries, soldiers serve their state, to protect it against 
adversaries. The methods by which the individual soldier was tied to his, and occasionally 
her, master have differed. What did not change is the fact that these soldiers fought on behalf 
of their recognized authority. Their basic task of providing security for the state has not 
changed considerably during almost two millennia. Hobbes was later criticized because of 
his one-sided emphasis on security. The more modern sociologist Max Weber also 
emphasizes the role of security when he defines a state: “A state is a group that can claim the 
monopoly on violence within a certain area” (Moelker & Soeters, 1999). Traditionally as 
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well as in recent times, the armed forces have been and still are an essential element of the 
state. 
3.2.2 Control over the armed forces 
The armed forces and military in the western world derive their legitimacy from the state and 
they operate on behalf of the state. The application of military power is usually seen as the 
state’s ultimate means of exercising power (Johansen & Staib, 2009). As a consequence, all 
actions undertaken by armed forces are usually attributed, or connected to, the responsible 
state. In democratic states the political leadership is placed above the armed forces and has 
final control over structure, maintenance and use of the armed forces (Born & Metselaar, 
2010). The governments bear the political responsibility for the actions of the military and 
armed forces can only operate with political approval.   
 The way governments organize and control delegated tasks performed by the military 
can be roughly divided into three basic forms (ibid). The first form is total control and full 
centralization of authority. The commander in the field21 has to receive permission for all 
decisions. In practice this form is very hard to use because of the overloading of 
communication systems and unacceptable time delays. The second form is negation. The 
commander has full authority to take decisions within his mission, but certain actions are 
specifically forbidden. He has to receive permission for actions that exceed his mission or 
given boundaries, the so called caveats. This practice is often used when the military perform 
tasks or missions under the command of an organization like NATO or the UN. The third 
form is the near absence of all control, where the commander receives total freedom of 
action, but with a defined mission or objectives. 
 The political leadership has to decide which authority will be delegated to which level 
in which situations. Given the fact that situations in military conflicts can change quickly, it 
is common practice in many countries to develop a set of “Rules of Engagement” for various 
situations. These describe what authority commanders have in different situations and down 
to which level responsibilities and decisions can be delegated. 
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In practice, the military need freedom of action to be able to fulfil their tasks. How 
much freedom they receive is a political decision. On the one side the need for political 
control, enhanced by near-real-time media coverage22, and internal political controversies, 
can lead to a tendency towards maximum control and micro-management. On the other hand, 
factors like chaos, bad communications and the actions of the adversary necessitate freedom 
of action for the military commander at the lowest possible level.  
This dilemma is not solved easily. International cooperation complicates clear lines of 
responsibility even further and can even be perceived as a threat to state-authority. On certain 
cases armed forces can be placed under the command of a different nation. This complicates 
implementing the political responsibility, especially when these forces undertake politically 
sensitive actions. Domestic popular support, or better: the lack of it, can cause governments 
to restrict the freedom of action of their military and keep them under tight control. 
Governments can even be forced to withdraw their forces because of domestic political 
pressure (Matlary, 2007). International obligations can thus reduce the freedom of 
governments domestically as well as the much needed freedom of action of the forces 
conducting the mission. As shown in the first part of this chapter, such caveats can lead to a 
lack of the much needed trust between the military of different nations. 
3.2.3 Internationalization of armed forces  
The military more and more have to cooperate with the military of other nations. 
Sometimes this even includes former adversaries, as we have witnessed when former 
Warsaw-Pact member states joined NATO. “More than any time in history, military 
integration in Europe has deepened and widened to an unprecedented level”, according to 
Ulriksen (Ulriksen, 2007). In today’s Europe, without a clear and present external threat, a 
large number of political and military leaders are, in principle, willing to give up a traditional 
key-element of their state identity: the link between national defence and the state (Mérand, 
2008). 
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Also according to Jackson and Sørensen a change is occurring since the mid-
twentieth century. They claim that the developments the institution of the “state” has gone 
through has had an effect on the way that it deals with security (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003). 
It includes a change in the perception of sovereignty and autonomy, two fundamental 
principles connected to statehood. These developments have had their impact on the 
structure of the armed forces and the way they operate.  
During the Cold War, international cooperation was common. In reality however, 
most armed forces worked largely independently from each other. Especially on land, armies 
hardly mixed below the level of (nationally organized) corps. There was very little actual 
cooperation at the tactical level. This situation changed drastically as of the mid-nineties. 
Multinational formations emerged and forces cooperated at very low tactical levels during 
missions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. “Today’s multinational forces are characterized 
not merely by strategic alliance but by close cooperation in-theatre at the tactical level” 
(King, 2010). States have come to depend on multinational cooperation. International 
cooperation is hard to imagine if states do not commit themselves to the promised tasks and 
accept less national influence over their forces. 
3.2.4 Political implications  
The political leadership is responsible for actions of their armed forces. In western 
democracies, democratic chosen governments bear this responsibility. The patterns of 
conflict have changed from defence against an existential threat to expeditionary, 
multinationally conducted “wars of choice”. For a government, participation in such conflicts 
requires domestic political support.  
To keep up political support and appease political opponents, governments are 
inclined to keep tight control over their forces and restrict certain actions by imposing 
caveats on the freedom of action of the forces. On the other side, IDC is complicated if states 
do not commit themselves also to the difficult and high-risk tasks: pacta sunt servanda23. 
Furthermore, governments have to accept that other states or multinational commanders task 
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their forces. If states take IDC seriously, they have to be willing to accept reduced influence 
over their military.  
3.2.5 Civil-Military relations and IDC: a preliminary conclusion 
The second part of this chapter addressed the special relation between a state and its 
armed forces and the relation between IDC and domestic politic support. Sovereignty, 
autonomy and political accountability on the one side and internationalization of defence on 
the other side do not necessarily pull cooperation in the same direction. On the contrary, 
domestic political factors can even hamper and sometimes stop further defence integration. 
IDC, both Ad Bellum decisions as well as decisions for permanent peace-time cooperation, 
restrict the political freedom of governments. If states decide to cooperate they have to be 
willing to give up parts of their sovereignty.  
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that IDC is not the easy solution as it is sometimes portrayed. 
In practice, IDC is perceived difficult and faces serious challenges and limitations. Among 
the challenges are transactional costs, diverging views on the right security policy, protection 
of industrial interests and the complications of having to compromise with multiple partners. 
Furthermore, the military requirements have to be taken into account, among which trust in 
partners is essential.  
Progress can also be observed, but mainly in supportive and logistical parts of the 
organization and in fields where purchase or development of capabilities are impossible for a 
single state. There are indications that at the strategic and political levels, establishing 
effective and efficient IDC remains difficult, while at the technical and tactical levels, 
soldiers find solutions and are more internationalized then ever before.  
States, their political leadership and the armed forces have a strong relation. Armed 
forces exist to protect and serve the state by carrying out orders of the government. Domestic 
political factors, especially governmental accountability, can increase the reluctance to 
commit forces to international operations or organize forces multinationally. On the other 
hand is IDC necessary if states want to maintain a serious military capability and 
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international influence. Which arrangements states make to solve the dilemma of sovereignty 
versus cooperation will be investigated in chapter four. The international dimension of state 
relations and the close relation between the state and the armed forces gives relevance for 
studying IDC in an IR theoretical perspective, as will be done in chapter six.   
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4. Trust and sovereignty in practice: nine cases of IDC.  
Trust and sovereignty are relevant factors in IDC. States can face a choice between 
keeping full control over their military or increased effectiveness. The price of increased 
effectiveness is giving up parts of sovereignty. States are only willing to do so if they trust 
each other. This chapter examines the “founding”-documents of nine cases of military 
cooperation in order to establish if a pattern can be recognized in how states in practice 
handle sovereignty and trust24. 
The cases are similar in their intent: to produce increased operational capacity by 
international cooperation. They vary regarding involved service25, age, main mechanism and 
participating nations. Some are “standing” arrangements including peacetime co-location and 
cooperation and others are “on order” arrangements active only after a political decision.  
First the ways and mechanisms which states use to formalize their defence 
cooperation will be presented. The second part will be the actual analyses of the cases. Each 
case will be introduced with a short description giving a short history, the intent of the 
cooperation and the main mechanism by which the desired effect should be achieved. The 
findings will be presented in an overview, after which these will be analysed. Finally the 
conclusions will be presented. 
4.1 Formalizing international defence relations and agreements 
The first form of official agreement between states is the treaty26. In most countries treaties 
have to be ratified by parliament. Agreements on IDC can be formalized through treaties. 
The treaty on the establishment of the First German-Netherlands Corps in Münster, between 
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26 The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines a treaty as:  “a contract in writing between two or more political authorities (as 
states or sovereigns) formally signed by representatives duly authorized and usually ratified by the lawmaking authority of 
the state.” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011). 
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the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany is an example of such an agreement (1GNC Corps Agreement, 1997). 
A second form of formalizing agreements between international military partners is 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). MoU’s are less formal than treaties but can still 
constitute a binding agreement. In general, MoU’s do not need parliamentary approval and 
can be negotiated and signed at a lower level such as ministers or chiefs of defence. This is 
the most common way to formalize IDC. MoU’s can be supplemented with technical 
arrangements (TA’s).   
Besides the way agreements are formalized, there is also an understanding to arrange 
what can be agreed upon when it comes to command authority. In order to determine what 
authority military commanders 
have, and to coordinate their 
actions and fulfil their tasks, 
standard command relationships 
have been developed within 
NATO. They give commanders 
the authority to give orders and 
instructions to assigned units 
(Koninklijke Landmacht, 2000). 
These standard command 
relationships are also used when 
military forces of various nations 
work together. 
The most inclusive form is full command: unlimited authority to employ units for any 
purpose. The lowest form of formalized command relationship is tactical control: a 
commander may only give orders concerning the coordination of movements and local 
protection27.  
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The following indicators are chosen when analyzing trust and sovereignty in IDC: 
− The level at which the agreement is formalized (Government, Ministerial level, 
Chiefs of Defence, staff officer / desk level). The higher the level, the more binding it 
becomes. 
− The way these agreements are formalized (Treaty, MoU, TA or other).  
− The level of command authority that is or can be handed over. 
− The caveats that states include. 
Analyzing what the partners want to achieve and what they have agreed on, can 
provide insight into how states balance sovereignty and increased effectiveness. It is not 
necessarily so that the agreed mechanisms are the only ones or the best objectively possible. 
What matters is if the involved parties agree that the arrangements will work for them on 
matters of sovereignty and control.  
Documented information from other sources, but directly connected to the case and 
providing additional insight especially about trust and sovereignty will also be used. This 
provides additional insight which in mechanisms can condition behaviour, especially where 
states are willing or forced to break an agreement with a partner.  
4.2 Cases 
The following cases will be examined: the multinational E-3A “AWACS” programme 
(1978), the Belgian-Dutch navy-cooperation ABNL (1975), The First German-Netherlands 
Corps Staff (1997), the multinational European Participating Air Forces Expeditionary Air 
Wing (BEL/DAN/NLD/NOR) (2004), the British-Dutch Amphibious Force (UKNL 
AF)(renewed 2005), the Norwegian-Dutch Army Cooperation Initiative (2007), the Strategic 
Air Command (2008), the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) (2009) and the 
European Air Transport Command (EATC) (2010).   
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4.2.1 AWACS / E3A cooperation  
In 1978, eleven NATO countries decided to purchase and operate a fleet of Boeing E-3A 
airplanes, later known as AWACS. Basically these are flying radars and air control stations. 
This capability was necessary to counter the threat of low-flying aircraft in the event of an 
attack on Western Europe. The 17 NATO-AWACS have been used during all major NATO 
operations, including control of US airspace after 9/11.  
Purchase of AWACS by any single NATO nation, other than the US and the UK, was 
too expensive. Therefore a program was developed to combine efforts and acquire a 
commonly owned and operated fleet28. The systems are operated by mixed crews with regard 
to nationality. The agreement was signed on the ministerial level with a multilateral 
memorandum of understanding29.  
The AWACS is the largest commonly funded acquisition program undertaken by 
NATO and is the only NATO owned operational force which is fully integrated into the 
command structure. Operational command of the unit is vested in the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), while the Force Commander of the AWACS-unit exercises 
day-to-day Operational Control (NATO, 2011). 
The use of mixed crews has on several occasions lead to difficult situations. In 2003 
Turkey requested AWACS surveillance of its border with Iraq. NATO, including the German 
government agreed and AWACS systems were deployed, on the premise of “routine flights 
at the Turkish border”. The German parliament appealed against this decision at the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2008). The court ruled that the 
German government did actually need parliamentary approval for the deployment of the 
AWACS-crews. The verdict was, inter alia, based on the following considerations:  
“German participation in the overall strategic direction of NATO and in decision-
making as to specific deployments of the alliance is quite predominantly in the hands 
of the Federal Government.(…cont.) But the freedom of the Federal Government to 
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 The MoU is partially classified and available with the author 
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structure its alliance policy does not include the decision as to who, on the domestic 
level, is to determine whether soldiers of the Bundeswehr will take part in a specific 
deployment that is decided in the alliance”.(ibid) 
In March 2011, again domestic German considerations hampered coalition 
operations. Initially, Germany opposed NATO action against the actions of the Libyan 
regime of colonel Khadaffi. NATO however needed the AWACS to enforce the no-fly zone 
and to direct its own air forces. As a result Germany decided to increase the contribution in 
Afghanistan, while simultaneously abstaining from participation over Libya. 
“Defence Minister Thomas de Maiziere confirmed that Germans would be withdrawn 
from AWACS reconnaissance aircraft over the Mediterranean but denied this was a 
direct exchange. De Maiziere restated Berlin's reservations about the Libyan mission. 
Taking part in AWACS operations over the Mediterranean -- which would aid strikes 
on Libya -- would require a mandate from the German parliament.” (Stamp, 2011). 
The AWACS cooperation exemplifies how cooperation between many smaller states 
can lead to generation of a collective good otherwise unaffordable. It also shows that national 
considerations, whether legal or political, can have a negative impact on the operational 
effectiveness of coalition owned and operated systems. 
4.2.2 Admiral Benelux, ABNL 
The Netherlands and Belgium have integrated large parts of their naval capabilities. The 
original BENELUX cooperation from 1944 received new momentum in 1995 when Belgium 
and the Netherlands agreed to place their naval assets under one unified binational command 
in peace-time30. An agreement to do so in wartime had existed already since 1975. The intent 
was to increase the operational output by a better use of available resources and avoidance of 
unnecessary duplication of effort. 
The operational headquarters is binational and manned by officers from both nations. 
Both countries decided to align their courses and training, to operate their fleets combined, to 
increase cooperation on materiel and logistics and to align programs of purchase and 
building. In practice this has led to a far reaching specialization. For example has the 
Netherlands’ navy become completely dependant on the Belgian knowledge concerning sea 
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mine operations and the Belgian navy has become dependant on Dutch frigate training. A 
second example is the better use of available helicopter capacity. Belgian helicopters can be 
stationed on Dutch frigates for missions and vice versa.  
 The agreement was signed on governmental level (ministers of defence) and 
formalized in an “agreement”. In peacetime, the assets are placed under Operational 
Command (OPCOM) of the ABNL. Tasking to perform operational missions remains a 
decision of the national governments. The ABNL is placed under direct command of the 
Belgian Chief of Staff of the Navy and of the Dutch Commander of the Navy for training and 
producing units in case of a jointly decided operation. In case of national operations the 
ABNL is under command of the respective commander from either Belgium or the 
Netherlands.  
 The ABNL is organized in a way that it remains possible to perform strictly national 
tasks independent from the other state. In practice however, the navies can hardly exist 
without each other anymore31. “Despite this far going integration and dependence this does 
not mean one can speak of one navy. The political decision to employ the armed forces is 
still limited to the national governments”32 (Maas, 2011). 
The cooperation shows that it is possible to specialize to a certain extent and keep 
national control, provided the two states can synchronize their security policy. A second 
factor is the different size and influence of the two states. Although officially they are equal, 
without the cooperation the Belgian navy would hardly exist or have influence33. It has in 
practice become dependant on the Netherlands and the cooperation is a mechanism enabling 
its further existence.  
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4.2.3 1 GNC Corps Staff 
In 1991 the ministers of defence of Germany and the Netherlands decided to establish a 
binational Corps Staff and collocated Air Operations Centre. In 1993 the governments of the 
Netherlands and Germany signed the treaty and the first commander was installed on 30 
august 1995. The official intent was to transform the static and relatively slow national forces 
into more agile and operational reaction units able to cope with the new challenges after the 
Cold War. In reality it also served as a vehicle to guard the available land forces against 
further reductions (Deni, 2007).  
The original binational corps staff has since developed into a multinational corps staff 
suited for international operations with multinational forces under command. Germany and 
the Netherlands are still the lead nations. The corps staff is currently one of NATO’s High 
Readiness Force Headquarters and on a rotational basis performs as Land Component 
Command of the NATO Response Force.  
 The treaty, ratified by both parliaments, is supplemented by a specific agreement, 
signed by the ministers of defence and with a set of MoU’s to arrange details. The MoU’s are 
also signed at ministerial level, though not by the ministers personally. Annex B of the corps 
agreement lists an extensive number of specific authorities vested in the corps commander 
(1GNC Corps Agreement, 1997). This list goes beyond the normal OPCOM or OPCON 
arrangements traditionally used in multinational land formations (Young, 1997).  
A separate Technical Arrangement concerning command and control arrangements 
was signed when the corps staff became a NATO rapid deployable corps staff. Signatories 
are the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Minister of 
Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command 
Atlantic and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. In practice this means that 
after a decision by the North Atlantic Council, the corps staff will be available for 
employment under NATO command (1GNC TA C2 Arrangements, 2002).  
 When the corps was established, both nations were aware that the right delegated 
level of command authority was instrumental to achieve a deep integration of the forces 
under command (Young, 1997). This is reflected in article 6 of the treaty that establishes a 
command authority that goes further than traditional NATO command relations. (1 GNC 
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Corps Convention, 1998, p. 4). This so called Integrated Directing and Control Authority 
vests authority in the corps commander for all tasks, except those that are specifically related 
to national tasks and discipline. The authority includes all German and Dutch subunits.  
 Despite all agreements, arrangements and combined operational missions, such as in 
ISAF, not all goes well concerning the planning of activities and responsibilities. Originally 
the 1 GNC staff was intended to be the land component command for the NATO Response 
Force(NRF) -18 rotation. In 2009 Germany decided unilaterally to withdraw the offer to 
NATO. As a result, the corps staff would not be a part of NRF rotations again before 2015. 
Since the planning for NRF was an important building block for the training and 
transformation of large parts of the Dutch army, affiliated to the corps staff, after their 
obligations in Uruzghan, this caused frustration on the Dutch side.  
The army had to change substantial parts of their planned training and fewer funds 
were available. Indirectly this would also affect the Dutch army-cooperation with Norway34. 
The unilateral German decision thus caused undesirable side effects, that would have been 
absent in the case of a single national headquarters, or could have been mitigated by better 
communication between the ministries of defence. At the lower levels this was certainly 
perceived as a breach of trust, since substantial parts of national Dutch planning were based 
on the earlier agreement with Germany on the planning of the 1 GNC staff.  
4.2.4 EPAF expeditionary Air Wing (EEAW) 
In the late 1970’s the air forces of the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium and Denmark decided 
to cooperate on the replacement of their fighter capability with the F-16 fighter/bomber 
airplane. This initiative, with the intent to achieve benefits by economy of scale and 
collective participation in the development, became known as the European Participating Air 
Forces (EPAF). For several decades the cooperation developed and did in fact lead to the 
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expected benefits. In 2001 Portugal joined the cooperation. The method of cooperation was 
so successful that the same approach was chosen for replacement of the F-16 by the F-3535. 
 The cooperation led to frequent contact between the participants, resulting in 
operational cooperation. In October 2002 a tri-national detachment of 18 Dutch, Danish and 
Norwegian F-16 aircraft and one Dutch KDC-10 air-to-air refuelling plane deployed to in 
Kyrgyzstan in support of ground forces in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring 
Freedom. Not all countries participated continuously; which countries participated and 
exactly with what number of planes varied over time and so did the location.  
 In 2004, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway Denmark and Portugal decided to 
formalize this operational cooperation in a MoU, with the intention to have a flexible 
framework for future operations. The purpose was to “…make optimum use of available and 
complementary assets in order to improve capabilities, synergy, preparedness and efficiency 
for deployed air operations involving EPAF members.” (EEAW MoU, 2004, p. 3). In 
February 2006, the Netherlands and Norway each provided four F-16s in the 1st 
Netherlands-Norwegian European Participating Forces Expeditionary Air Wing (1 
NLD/NOR EEAW), now operating from Kabul airfield in Afghanistan, in support of ISAF. 
When the Netherlands decided to move the F-16’s south to Kandahar in summer 2006, 
Norway did not continue its contribution. For political reasons Norway was not willing to 
operate in southern Afghanistan. 
The cooperation is not the establishment of a permanent unit, but a skeleton-
framework for composition of a unit in case the sending states decide to participate in a 
mission. The command and control arrangements in this MoU reflect the “on call” character. 
Articles from the sections four, five and six of the MoU state that: 
− It is a prerogative of each Participant to define the level of participation (4.1) 
− This MoU will under no circumstances preclude the independent execution of the 
Participants’ respective national tasks as well as their other international 
obligations. (4.2) 
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− Nothing in this MoU is intended to conflict with international law or the national 
law of the Participants. In case of a conflict, international- and national law will 
prevail. (4.4) 
− National contributions to the EEAW Detachment will remain under Full 
Command of the respective Partners. In principal, Partners will delegate 
Operational Command or Operational Control to the appropriate international 
commanders in accordance with international procedures. (5.3) 
− For coordination purposes, the Partners will inform the Planning Cell in writing 
of any national caveats to the Rules of Engagement to a specific operation or 
exercise. (6.2) 
The EEAW cooperation is an evolution of almost thirty years of cooperation that 
started with purchase of the same equipment, and the wish to achieve economy of scale. This 
approach is generally considered a success36. Participation in operations is however not 
mandatory and remains subject to the decision of any single government of the participants. 
The agreed command and control agreements in the MoU reflect this by mentioning 
(inter)national law, national caveats and national political autonomy concerning 
participation. The Dutch national decision to move the F-16’s closer to the own ground 
forces in Uruzghan ended the multinational cooperation of the EEAW in Afghanistan.  
4.2.5 UK / NL Amphibious Cooperation 
Since 1973, a battalion of the Netherlands Marine Corps has been integrated in the British 3 
Commando Brigade during exercises and real conflict situations. Together, these form the 
UK/NL Amphibious Force. The goal of the cooperation is the “provision of a coherent and 
interoperable littoral manoeuvre force at the formation level” (UK/NL AF MoU, 2005). This 
cooperation is the oldest of its kind in Europe (Brinkman, 2006). The UK/NL Amphibious 
Force specialises in conducting amphibious operations.  
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Dutch Marine infantry battalions are assigned to the UK/NL AF on rotational basis 
and in practice become a battalion in the 3 Commando Brigade (UK). The cooperation 
between the Dutch Marines and the Royal Marines has led to extensive integration and 
interoperability in the areas of operations, training, doctrine and logistics. The UK and The 
Netherlands have furthermore conducted a close coordination concerning the use of naval 
assets and transport in support of the amphibious elements. During the Cold War, UK/NL 
AF was a part of the forces intended to operate on NATO’s northern flank, closely allied to 
US Marine forces. The combined UK/NL AF was deployed combined only once. In 1991 
elements deployed to northern Iraq for operation Safe Haven, providing safety for the 
Kurdish people. 
 The renewed MoU was signed on ministerial level in 2005. This MoU interestingly 
specifically states that other states are not welcome to participate. “While supporting the 
development of European amphibious capability, the complexities of coordinating and 
integrating more than 2 nations mitigate against wider membership.” (UK/NL AF MoU, 
2005, p. 7). When UK and NL elements are concentrated into the combined taskforce, the 
command and control arrangements will be established according to task, composition and 
ratio of forces. The full command is with the national Chiefs of Defence. The (partial) 
command over the forces will be delegated to subordinate (NATO) commanders depending 
on the situation. In case of a deployment for the EU, “other command relationships will be 
established.” (UK/NL AF MoU, 2005, p. 10). 
4.2.6 Army Cooperation Initiative (ACI) 
In the late nineties and early 2000’s many countries were still restructuring their armed forces 
and had a surplus of equipment. Norway and the Netherlands decided to combine efforts and 
use each others’ surplus equipment to fill existing gaps in their defence structures. This 
resulted in the so called “Package Deal”. The deal included artillery- engineer- and air 
defence equipment. The package deal was part of a bigger effort of both countries to enhance 
their defence cooperation. The Declaration of Intent from 2002 aimed at a closer cooperation 
between the armed forces of the two countries involving all services. (DOI Norway and The 
Netherlands, 2002). 
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 By unilateral Norwegian decision the the package deal was cancelled. The personnel 
involved were already in place and the two chiefs of the armies decided to continue the 
cooperation, with the reduced ambition of operational cooperation. As a result the 
Norwegian Brigade North became affiliated to the training cycle of the first German-
Netherlands Corps and the Telemark Battalion became affiliated to the 43 Mechanised 
Brigade. In 2004 Norway contributed to the Dutch led NRF-4 and in 2005 the 1 GNC 
conducted a large exercise in Norway. Although the total package deal failed, many projects 
were continued separately. The Netherlands did purchase the NASAMS system, engineer 
equipment was exchanged and Norway could make use of the knowledge on RPV systems to 
acquire the tactical UAV “Raven”.  
 The ACI was formalized in 2007 with a document without legal status, although it in 
practise was seen as MoU (ACI, 2007). Signatories are the army commanders. Connected to 
the ACI document were seven different MoU’s. In 2010 the set of MoU‘s was replaced by a 
new co-signed document (the ACI Roadmap) leading to the formation of a combined Dutch-
Norwegian contribution to the NRF-18 Land Component Command (LCC) under the 
leadership of the 1 GNC. Exchange personnel were stationed in staffs and units in as well the 
Netherlands as well as in Norway. 
Both army-commanders were dedicated to the cooperation, but stressed the need to 
avoid dependency on each other. Simultaneously they “acknowledge that in the long run 
restrictive effects may come with intensified co-operation and deepened integration.” (ACI, 
2007, p. 1). The caution has proved to be justified. A change in the NRF-rotation of LCC’s 
(see also par 4.2.3 on 1 GNC) and massive reductions in the exercise budgets have led to 
cancellation of the original NRF-18 goal. The frequent cooperation with exercises and the 
presence of exchange personnel has enabled contacts between commanders at all levels of 
the Norwegian and Netherlands’ armies, thus allowing use of each others’ expertise, 
capabilities and resources.  
The unilateral decision of Norway to cancel the package deal has caused 
disappointment and frustration especially in the Dutch defence staff and ministry. It caused a 
budget deficit of approximately 100 million Euros and delayed the introduction of much 
needed systems. As a result the actual implementation of what later became the ACI, as well 
as new initiatives met much opposition and distrust amongst higher officers and civilian 
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employees of the Dutch armed forces. The cancellation was perceived as a breach of trust. 
Norwegian officers were aware of this, but saw themselves faced with a political decision37.  
 The ACI also faced limitations caused by the level of cooperation. In Norway as well 
as in the Netherlands, decisions on budgets, materiel, equipment and personnel are 
increasingly taken on defence staff or ministerial level. The freedom of action for the army-
level has decreased in the last years. The Dutch-Norwegian cooperation, important at army 
level, did on occasion not receive the same attention and support at the level of defence staff 
and ministry in both countries. The presence of exchange personnel was a positive factor, 
enabling an enhanced quality of information and shorter lines of communication38.  
4.2.7 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) 
One of the military shortfalls in many European countries is the lack of available strategic air 
and sea transport. At the 1999 NATO summit in Washington the decision was made to 
improve the collective strategic air- and sealift capabilities. At the Istanbul Summit in June 
2004, this decision was translated into specific agreements between a number of NATO 
countries. They agreed to pool their resources and provide NATO with the required air- and 
sealift capabilities. Ten NATO countries39 and Sweden and Finland began cooperation to 
establish and operate the Strategic Air Wing (SAC), with three C-17 transport airplanes.  
The twelve partner states have jointly established the NATO Airlift Management 
Organization (NAMO). NAMO then again has established the NATO Airlift Management 
Agency (NAMA) which is responsible for building up the organization and the operation of 
the SAC. The SAC Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW), that actually operates the aircraft, is based in 
Hungary and in operation since July 2009. Operations have included support to ISAF, 
humanitarian relief in Haiti and Pakistan and peacekeeping missions in Africa (NATO SAC, 
2010). The participating countries receive a number of “flight hours” according to the size of 
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their contribution. These flight hours can be used for any purpose in support of national 
requirements. The unit is multinationally manned.  
The initiative for the SAC was taken at the level of the North Atlantic Council. The 
MoU is signed by the ministers of defence. Concerning command and control it is arranged 
that the member nationals maintain full command and that operational control over the 
participating personnel will be given to the commanding officer of the heavy air wing 
(HAW/CC). Participating nations have the right to deny certain types of cargo and may 
prohibit crews of their nationality from cooperating in transporting this cargo. The 
participants are however expected to inform the HAW/CC be forehand of these caveats. 
(SAC MoU, 2008, p. 33).  
The construction of rights and responsibilities in the MoU allows countries to use the 
flight hours according to their national priorities and needs, as long as this does not break 
international law and does not have a commercial intent. Rules and regulations have been 
agreed in order to prioritize competing requests for flight-hours. The HAW/CC is the 
ultimate authority in de-conflicting competing flight-hour requests (SAC MoU, 2008, p. 34).  
The SAC has been established to cater for a much needed, but scarce resource: 
strategic air transport. All interviewed considered the initiative as a well functioning 
organization. The partners have succeeded in establishing a multinational unit with 
capabilities that would not have been able available for a single smaller nation. The high 
demand for strategic air transport has further has increased the pressure to find a solution and 
come to cooperation. The fact that two partners are not NATO members (Sweden and 
Finland) has been a “problem” that could be accepted and managed by establishing the 
NATO Airlift Management Organisation (NAMO). 
4.2.8 Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO)  
The Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden, Finland and to a certain extent also Iceland and 
Denmark, have on several occasions tried to coordinate their security policies and to come to 
defence cooperation. This has been difficult. The countries have, especially during the Cold 
War, had different perceptions of security, different defence-traditions and different 
memberships in international organizations (Saxi, 2011). In 2009, three different forms of 
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cooperation were brought under one umbrella to increase the effect and streamline the 
efforts40: Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). 
 “The main aim and purpose of the Nordic defence Cooperation is to strengthen the 
participating nations´ national defence, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient 
common solutions.” (NORDEFCO MoU, 2009, p. 3). NORDEFCO does therefore not intend 
to establish a common unit or capability. It is agreed on governmental level and the MoU is 
signed by ministers of defence or foreign affairs. In 2007 the Chiefs of Defence of Norway 
and Sweden (Diesen and Syrén) had already presented a feasibility study on “mutual 
reinforcing defence structures”, which indicated at potential efficiency benefits and increases 
in operational effect (Innset, 2010).  
NORDEFCO is interesting in the light of this study because of the debate it caused. 
The initiative is not without criticism, although all are in favour of cooperation and increased 
efficiency. General Diesen was aware of this when he remarked that he had doubts about the 
political will to actually go so far as to close bases and disband units nationally, in favour of 
international effects (Diesen, 2010).  
This was not the only reason for scepticism. Magnus Petersson argued that the 
NORDEFCO could be perceived as competition for NATO and that the participating 
countries might be more culturally different than perceived at first glance (Petersson, 2010). 
Bjørn Innset came to the conclusion that national sovereignty would set clear limitations on 
closer defence cooperation and integration (Innset, 2010). Håkon Lunde Saxi claims that 
certain of the limitations could be mitigated, but only if visible and clear benefits could be 
achieved and shown in order to overcome domestic opposition (Saxi, 2011).  
According to Grete Faremo, Norwegian Minister of Defence, increased cooperation 
on training, planning, exercises and acquisition, will continue. A Nordic declaration of 
solidarity was not an option in January 2011 (Faremo, 2011a). One month later however, she 
stated, although such a declaration would have to be in respect and accordance with NATO 
commitments, that... 
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“We are considering to make a joint Declaration of Solidarity between the Nordic 
countries, confirming the extent to which our partnerships have evolved. The idea is 
partly to sum up our achievements so far, partly to formalise our mutual support of 
common values and interests.”(Faremo, 2011b) 
Clearly the political debate on Nordic defence cooperation is continuing. The 
academic debate does illustrate the relation between cooperation, autonomy and sovereignty, 
as shown by Innset and Saxi. There seems to be a serious conviction that cooperation in this 
form will lead to less national control and independence. The MoU seems to reflect this 
thought when it states that… 
“Nothing in this MoU will imply any obligation far the Participants to commit 
themselves to participating in certain activities or projects. Unless otherwise agreed, 
each Participant retains the right to withdraw at any stage from activities or projects 
conducted under the auspices of this MoU” (NORDEFCO MoU, 2009). 
It is difficult to imagine true benefits of cooperation when there does not have to be a 
serious commitment and all are free to withdraw from the combined efforts. Presumably 
smaller beneficial effects could be achieved, but serious gains require serious commitments. 
As long as the domestic pressure for independency prevails, such cooperation remains 
unlikely. The NORDEFCO case typifies the central difficulties of IDC. 
4.2.9 European Air Transport Command (EATC) 
The European Air Transport Command is an evolution of earlier initiatives to make better 
use of the available air transport assets of the air forces of European states. The original plan 
is from 1999, when Germany and France decided to cooperate, but it never became effective 
as a command. In 2002 the initiative was formalized in the European Airlift Co-ordination 
Cell (EACC). This developed into the European Airlift Centre in 2004. In April 2006 a letter 
of intent was signed between Germany and France to take the step from coordination to a 
real command. The EATC concept was agreed between Germany, France, The Netherlands 
and Belgium. In 2010 the technical agreement (TA) for the EATC was signed (EATC TA, 
2010).  
 The difference between earlier the coordination and the current form, which is a 
command, is that the EATC actually has peace-time command over the air transport fleets. 
The participants have agreed to… 
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“Gradually transfer and integrate within one single multinational command all 
relevant national responsibilities and personnel which together direct the force 
generation and the mission execution of the combined air transport capabilities, thus 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the Participants’ military Air Transport 
(AT) efforts.” (Rouceau, 2010, p. 3) 
 The step to leave international coordination and place the air transport assets under 
command indicates a high level of trust and confidence in the multinational command, 
stationed in Eindhoven, The Netherlands. The reasons to come to this solution were, 
amongst others, cuts in defence budgets, reduction of available personnel, the necessity to 
decrease the logistic “footprint” during operations and the need for interoperability 
improvements  (ibid).  
 The member states place their air transport planes, 165 in total41, under OPCON of 
the EATC. The planes remain stationed on their national bases, spread across the 
participating states. The EATC assembles transport needs, formulates tasks and distributes 
these in the most efficient way to the best suited unit. At all times, the nations have the right 
to revoke the transfer of authority to the EATC and claim their assets for national use, 
without stating a reason (EATC TA, 2010). The EATC at Eindhoven is manned by 156 
personnel of all participating states. These remain under Full Command of the respective 
nations regarding individual disciplinary matters, but are otherwise OPCON to the EATC 
commander.  
 Besides the operational execution of air transport, the EATC also has the task to 
develop policies and common standards related to air transport employment, training, 
technical, and logistical support. These are the so called “functional areas”. The 
recommending, coordinating or commanding authority in this area depends however on the 
functional domain or subject (Rouceau, 2010). The EATC hierarchically is placed between 
the four national air force commands and the four national executive air transport units. 
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 The EATC does also face challenges. For this study the following are interesting: 
countries give different levels of transfer of authority concerning the functional area’s, there 
still is no EATC Treaty or MoU and there is no common view on the enlargement policy42.  
4.3 Overview 
Placing the cases in an overview gives the following result: 
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 Spain and Luxemburg have the intent of joining and several other European states have signalled interest to do so.   
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4.4 Analysis 
The first factor analysed was the level at which the cooperation was agreed or confirmed. 
These vary from army–commander level in case of the ACI to ratification by parliament for 
the 1 GNC. In all cases with the intent of establishing a permanent international military 
structure but one, governmental or parliamentary confirmation is present. The EATC for now 
only was confirmed on behalf of the defence staffs, but the necessity for a “higher” level of 
confirmation is realized. This indicates that International Defence Cooperation is a political 
issue, or at least requires political approval. 
 The second factor of analysis was the form of document used to formalize the 
cooperation. In practice the Memorandum of Understanding is most frequently used. A MoU 
can however vary from a relative simple and uncontroversial bilateral document to a 
politically highly debated and contested international agreement between large numbers of 
states. In the case of the 1 GNC, the German and Netherlands’ parliaments have ratified a 
treaty regarding the cooperation, making it more formal under international law and 
preventing easy changes. Although the EATC cooperation is formalised only by a technical 
agreement, this does not seem to affect the build up and operations. The form of agreement is 
apparently less important than the process of achieving agreement on the contents.  
   The third element analysed was the level of command authority over their personnel 
and operations that states were willing to hand over to others. Full command is always 
retained at the national level. States are willing to delegate operational command or control. 
The oldest three collaborations all have OPCOM delegated as default, although all have 
some form of reservation or adaption. Newer forms (since 2004) seem to have OPCON as 
standard, but depending on the situation this can be amended. The case of 1 GNC is special 
since Germany and the Netherlands have agreed create an extended command authority for 
the Corps Commander. 
 Simultaneously with the change from default OPCOM to OPCON, the documents 
start to include the formal possibility for states to formulate caveats, use own rules of 
engagement and possibilities to revoke transfer of authority back to national command. More 
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recent MoU’s explicitly emphasize that the MoU’s are not intended to conflict with 
international or national law of the participants, while this was more implicit in the earlier 
MoU’s. The shift in command authority and the formalized option to have caveats began to 
appear after the events of 9/11, the beginning of US-led operations in Afghanistan and the 
US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In particular the American decision to invade Iraq led to deep 
and serious controversies between the US and a number of European allies like France and 
Germany (Moore, 2007). The German restriction on the use of AWACS crews is a 
consequence of this division. Possibly governments became more aware of the political risks 
of coalition operations and wanted to build guarantees against automatic participation into 
the agreements. The available documents alone however are not enough to conclude these 
are linked, since they do not state why these restrictions were included. 
 From analyzing the documents one can conclude that all participating states are 
committed to making the cooperation work and contribute accordingly. On the other hand 
one can get the impression all are looking for a guarantee that others will keep their part of 
the deal as well. Reality shows a different practice. On several occasions states were not able 
or willing to fulfil their part of the agreement. Germany had to withdraw their AWACS 
crews from participation over Turkey for domestic reasons. The Dutch decision to move the 
EEAW contribution caused the termination of the joint effort in Kabul. Norway decided in a 
late stage to cancel the materiel cooperation “Package Deal” with the Netherlands, although 
one can say this was not part of a formalized cooperation. In all three cases national interests 
came first, to the dislike of the partners. 
 The analyzed documents in themselves do not give conclusive insight into the role of 
trust. One can explain far-going arrangements concerning authority of each others’ personnel 
and actions as a sign of trust. An example of this is the far-going delegation in the case of the 
1 GNC, arranged in a treaty. On the other hand one can argue that “among friends there is no 
need for too many formalities”. An absence of formalities and rules and faith that the right 
solution will be found according to the situation can also be a sign of trust.  
The recent NORDEFCO cooperation stands out because of the presence of an 
academic and political debate that followed the initiative. This debate includes the question 
whether, and if yes in how far, national security can become dependant on other states, 
including non-NATO countries. Besides confirming the relation between sovereignty, trust 
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and security, it is also an indication that the security policy “tradition” one comes from is 
important in analyzing the potential for cooperation partners.  
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter analysed the question if a pattern could be established on the practical 
agreements on the role of sovereignty in the founding documents of cases of IDC, and if the 
command relations can indicate the level of trust the partners have in each other.  
The founding-documents, how these are formulated and the agreed command 
relations alone do not provide sufficient insight in the role of trust. Incidents concerning the 
initiatives indicate that trust does play an important part in coming to cooperation, or 
determining if an initiative will be continued. Whether lack of trust that another state will not 
fulfil its obligations is one of reasons that make states reluctant to engage in cooperation, or 
if other factors play a role will be explored further using the interview results in the next 
chapter.  
The analysis indicates furthermore that states need mechanisms or guarantees to 
control the balance between sovereignty and dependency; although these offer no guarantee 
and agreements can be changed or neglected for numbers of reasons. States increasingly 
seem to struggle with collective actions that are not necessarily in line with their national 
efforts or capabilities. In order to reserve or revoke their control, more recent MoU’s, TA’s 
and other agreements contain clauses and articles allowing states to withdraw or to abstain 
from participation. Sovereignty remains a key factor in military cooperation with other states.  
Third, IDC is indeed a political issue, or it can become one when national interests, 
policies or possibilities conflict with earlier agreements. The academic debate on the 
NORDEFCO cooperation is quite interesting in this context, especially since the dependency 
issue is discussed.   
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5. Trust and Sovereignty at the political-military level. 
This chapter will discuss the motives and mechanisms behind IDC in order to realize a better 
insight into the role of trust and sovereignty at the political-military level. Four high ranking 
officers working in the defence staffs and Ministries of Defence of Norway and the 
Netherlands were interviewed. The officers bear responsibility for advice on IDC to the 
political leadership and for implementing IDC. 
The interviews were built up around general questions regarding IDC and hampering 
factors and mechanisms. The interviewees were asked for their opinion on the role of trust 
and sovereignty in a broader context of international cooperation in general. The interviews 
were however not specifically tailored to the cases as presented in chapter five. Some of the 
cases were discussed as examples. The research question as such was however not presented 
literally to the officers interviewed in order to avoid biased answers.  
 First, the reasons why states want to cooperate militarily will be explored. This is 
followed by an assessment of which forms of IDC are likely and which are unlikely to 
happen. The motives why cooperation is unlikely or less likely to happen successfully are 
especially interesting when they include trust as factor. Finding out which factors actually 
work for and against IDC is the second part of this chapter. Finally the findings will be 
analyzed and related to the findings from chapters four and five and the conclusions will be 
presented.  
5.1 Motives for conducting IDC 
States do not engage in international cooperation without good reason. This applies to IDC as 
well. There is an agreement among the interviewees that states conduct IDC out of self 
interest. They expect a form of benefit or return for their efforts. The forms in which this 
return comes is however diverse and can differ with the situation or cooperation. 
 The first important reason to cooperate is that it enables achieving more collectively 
that the single nations would be able to attain. This looks like a very simple explanation, but 
it lies at the heart of every effort or initiative. The mechanisms that lead to this synergetic 
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effect are however diverse. They can be roughly divided into two categories: reduced input 
and increased output. An example of reducing input is the effort to come to cooperation in 
the development and purchase of equipment. Economy of scale can lead to lower prices per 
item. This allows for example a higher output (more equipment) for the same budget.  A 
second example is the SAC / C-17 initiative. States cooperating can afford a pool of C-17 
planes they otherwise would not have been able to afford and operate. 
 An example of increasing the collective output is the EATC. The already available air 
transport capacity of the member states can be used more efficiently when they are under a 
unified command. Empty return flights can be avoided and the mix of aircraft types allows a 
more efficient use of assets by better tailoring of transport needs and transport capabilities. 
Thus the assets already available lead to a higher output in terms of effectiveness as well as 
efficiency. 
 A second reason is interoperability with coalition partners. This is particularly 
important from a small-state perspective. When smaller states wish to participate in 
international operations, they have to be interoperable with especially the larger partners. 
Very few states are still able to conduct military operations on their own. Military from 
smaller states that participate in operations will therefore always do this as part of a coalition 
with a bigger state like the US, the UK or France. A state that desires to contribute with 
relevance is therefore required to be interoperable with its partners. Not being able to “plug 
and play” with leading nations can lead to marginalization and irrelevance. Contrary to most 
other forms of cooperation this does not necessarily lead to savings. It might even require 
extra investments to become interoperable.  
 Interoperability with specific states is strongly connected to the security policy of a 
state. It can encompass a choice for several decades. Defence equipment is generally in use 
for a very long time and developing conceptual interoperability, like for example cooperation 
between air forces, might even entail the education of generations of pilots. The decision to 
develop and maintain interoperability is therefore a strategic long term choice.  
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  Other reasons named for engaging in structural IDC are common security interests43, 
maintaining quality of training and professional standards and maintaining diversity44 among 
staff. Furthermore, today’s operations in ad-hoc coalitions and with new partners require the 
capability to adapt and be flexible in order to be able to work together. At the operational, 
tactical and technical levels the reality of operations is completely multinational. Officers 
and soldiers need to be prepared and trained for this. Multinationality has therefore to be 
integrated into training programs and exercises. 
 Among the reasons given, the most important reason for conducting IDC is very clear 
according to the interviewees: saving money. The increasing costs of defence equipment and 
personnel combined with flat or decreasing budgets, force defence organizations to cooperate 
and where possible increase their efficiency. 
5.2 IDC in practice 
In order to achieve insight into which factors influence the chance of successful cooperation 
the interviewees were asked if they saw any areas that were specifically suited or not suited 
at all for internationalization. The answers to this question varied and do not provide a clear 
pattern. They do however provide the insight that some areas are probably more open to 
cooperation than others.  
5.2.1 Areas unlikely for multinational cooperation 
Only three areas were specifically named as either too difficult or undesirable for IDC.  One 
of the more obvious areas is the field of intelligence. Intelligence is organized mainly 
nationally and intelligence results are considered nationally owned. Sharing intelligence 
between states has been highly problematic and difficult for many years. Especially tactical 
intelligence, necessary to enable operations during missions and necessary also in the light of 
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force protection of own forces, should always remain under national command45. The same 
reason was given in relation to a possible internationalization of submarines. These were too 
valuable as national intelligence assets, and therefore should not be considered for 
international pooling46.  
A second area given as example where internationalization might not be possible or 
desirable is when systems are very complex, operate in high risk situations and require a very 
long time to become operational, such as operating submarines47. Multinationality on board 
such a platform would be too complicated.   
The third area where multinational cooperation would not be possible is when 
national laws prohibit certain actions. For example, Norway has signed the Ottawa 
Convention. A Norwegian flight crew, even when operating a multinationally owned C-17 
from the SAC, is therefore not allowed to cooperate in transporting anti personnel mines48. A 
second legal limitation could arise when a state does not allow foreign militaries to 
participate in the enforcement of national sovereignty.  
In general, very few areas for cooperation are not feasible or principally closed for 
cooperation, although states want to maintain the final say about operations with their 
military forces49. The idea of which capabilities absolutely have to be owned nationally has 
changed over the years. Multinationality has become the standard in order to maintain a 
credible defence capability.  The development runs parallel to the decreasing budgets and 
increasing costs50. Multinational solutions become more acceptable with the increase of the 
budgetary problems: less money encourages cooperation51. 
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5.2.2 Areas likely for multinational cooperation 
In certain areas IDC is more likely to become a success. All interviewees named cooperation 
in the development and purchase of equipment as an obvious example. Simultaneously they 
mentioned the problems in realizing such cooperation. Multinational cooperation in the 
purchase of equipment can only become beneficial if all are willing to accept certain 
compromises and do not insist that “their” solution is best. All interviewees agreed that one 
had to accept a “good enough” solution and not necessarily go for the best possible. If this is 
not acceptable one should probably decide to organize the development of equipment in such 
a way that states can diversify some parts or modules, as was finally done in the development 
of NATO frigates.52 
 The second mentioned field where it is logical to cooperate is in operations. Practice 
shows that at the technical and tactical level problems can be solved and a far reaching 
integration is possible, despite differences in tactics, techniques and procedures. Even 
national caveats can be overcome if states announce these in time so they can be taken into 
account in the planning of operations. Furthermore a likeminded willingness to share risks is 
important to achieve mutual trust53.  
 A third logical area of cooperation is logistics. Various elements of logistics were 
given as examples. The EATC was mentioned as an excellent example of how multinational 
cooperation enables a better use of available resources, while at the same states can always 
withdraw the planes they might need for strictly national purposes. The area of transport in 
general is very well suited to cooperation. Other forms of logistical cooperation, like 
maintenance and supply, could be explored much further than currently is done. A 
hampering factor is the lack of standardization of equipment.  
In areas with a higher level of standardization, international cooperation is easier and 
becoming more and more the rule. An example is the increasing use of the NATO 
Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). This agency’s main task is to assist NATO 
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nations by organizing the common procurement and supply of spare parts and arranging 
maintenance and repair services. It can work for the support of various weapon systems of 
member states. NAMSA is available when two or more nations operate the same system and 
have made the decision to use NAMSA’s support facilities54. 
Two of the advantages with logistical cooperation are that it is politically rather 
uncontroversial and that it can be easily quantified financially. Supply and maintenance are, 
at least perceived to be less directly connected to the use of weapons. The political debate on 
responsibility for the effects thus becomes less controversial. Furthermore, logistic 
cooperation in supply, maintenance and services can lead to direct and visible savings, which 
makes the cooperation attractive. 
The fourth area where IDC is likely to take place successfully is in technically 
advanced and very expensive and rare capabilities like air- and missile defence, medium and 
larger unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), command and control systems, guided weapons, etc. 
These have become so expensive that very few states can afford the development, purchase 
and maintenance alone55. In essence this is the same mechanism that led to the NATO 
AWACS project and the SAC institutive.  
The dilemma with these kinds of systems, especially with the weapons systems, is 
that it triggers the debate on political responsibility for the decision to use them. The fact that 
NATO today has ownership over a number of systems for command and control, warning, 
etc, but does not operate any weapon system illustrates this debate. 
Summing up, according to the interviewees no area of IDC is without difficulties or 
challenges, but the fields best suited would be those of acquisition of defence equipment, 
operations, logistics and the acquisition of systems that are not affordable for single 
countries.  
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5.3 Which factors influence IDC? 
In general, IDC was described as a complex matter. At the same it was recognized as a 
necessity, especially for smaller states, in order to be able to maintain capabilities, save costs 
and be able to deploy for “out of area” operations56. There is no single answer to the question 
why IDC is so complicated. The following paragraphs present the most important favorable 
and hampering factors for IDC derived from the four interviews. They influence decision 
making at the defence staff and ministerial level when considering IDC. These factors are 
important to provide insight into especially the role of sovereignty and trust.  
5.3.1 Favorable factors 
First and foremost, a shortfall in necessary but expensive capabilities increases the 
willingness for international cooperation. Cooperation can make these capabilities 
affordable. The flat or decreasing defence budgets, combined with rising costs accelerate the 
speed and levels at which IDC becomes a realistic option.  
The second relevant factor is globalization. This trend affects military operations and 
in a sense is “inevitable”57. Missions are executed with a multitude of participating nations. 
Also NATO missions include the participation of non-NATO states from all over the world. 
Furthermore the influence of civil agencies and NGO’s on military operations is increasing. 
These factors contribute to making international cooperation much more normal at a lower 
level. This will have a psychological effect on the acceptance of international cooperation as 
“default” modus operandi for the military58. 
The third factor is membership of existing international organizations. Although 
operations can be conducted with many different partners, the decision to start a long-lasting 
partnership or cooperation is affected by the fact that a state is member of the same 
international framework, like NATO or the EU59. Being a member of the same organization 
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is not a guarantee of successful cooperation, but it does make it easier to use existing 
organizations, frameworks and meeting platforms. For most member states it is difficult to 
imagine starting new materiel cooperation if it would not be based on NATO standards. 
Like-mindedness and a shared political view are important factors. The cooperation within 
NATO has led to a situation where most remaining differences have become manageable. 
Within NATO, all countries have become potential partners, although not for all forms of 
cooperation60. 
The fourth factor is closely related to the previous one. Successful earlier cooperation 
does produce trust in a system and in partners and is likely to be repeated. The EPAF/F-16 
cooperation was taken as a model for the JSF/F-35 project, and with some of the same 
participating partners61. The SAC/C-17 cooperation uses a similar business model as the 
AWACS-cooperation did, although adaptations had to be made since two participating 
nations are not NATO members. A previous successful history and a proven track record of 
concrete results and benefits make the decision to start a new program on the same premises 
easier. 
5.3.2 Hindering factors 
The interviewees in general had no difficulty naming factors that hampered or negatively 
influenced the chance of success within IDC. The factors can be categorized into technical 
reasons and factors regarding content.  
Three technical hampering factors were named. The first is the use of different 
standards, leading to technical incompatibility and additional costs. Second, cooperation 
becomes more difficult and is less likely to succeed with an increase in the number of 
participants. Thirdly, transaction costs can sincerely limit the effects gained by cooperation. 
These costs include decreased effectiveness as result of extra coordination, language, 
personnel and travelling costs etc. This explains to a certain extent why cooperation between 
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air forces is relatively cheaper to accomplish than between army elements. The air planes can 
more easily travel the involved distances with fewer additional costs.  
 Besides these more technical factors, the following four factors negatively influence 
IDC. Firstly, IDC is considered a political matter. As discussed in chapter three, all military 
actions are subject to political control. This does complicate cooperation, especially at higher 
levels. Structural military cooperation takes many years to implement. Most often the 
military time horizon is beyond the political four year perspective. Governments can change, 
possibly leading to changes on earlier decisions62. This adds uncertainty to the military 
cooperation efforts. Furthermore, governments depend on domestic political support. They 
therefore need the possibility to abstain from participating in military actions, or even to 
reverse earlier taken decisions. This mechanism is has a strong effect on structural 
cooperation. Political insecurity hampers IDC. 
The interviewees in general agreed that a truly deep military integration would 
probably not be possible without (at least some) political integration. MG de Kruif observes 
a discrepancy between the reality on tactical and technical levels and on the strategic level. 
At the lower levels multinational integration is a fact of life, while the strategic level still 
struggles with it and lacks a clear view or vision on how to handle this development. The 
formation of multinational units solely based on budgetary arguments was not considered to 
have a realistic chance of success.  
The second factor is the protection of national autonomy and independence. Role 
specialization within NATO has been discussed for many years. Financially as well as 
military it would make sense to develop military capabilities multinationally from the start 
and focus on only certain capabilities per state63. The reason is does not happen is that states 
want to be able to act independently. They do not want to become dependant on other states 
for deciding to and being able to use their armed forces, even if in reality this use will always 
be in an international setting64. The standard approach is therefore still that states first see if 
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they can organize their capabilities along national lines, with international solutions as a 
second option.  
Independence includes the protection of national industrial capabilities and 
knowledge. For smaller states this form of independence is however not realistic any longer. 
Most defence equipment producers have merged into a few international conglomerates. 
According to MG Knutsen defence procurement is the area where probably the most savings 
could be accomplished. Controversially, producers have little to gain from standardization, 
but have an interest in producing as many versions of equipment as possible. They are to a 
certain extent still encouraged to do this by the national defence equipment organizations65.  
 The third factor is of a more psychological nature. MG Knutsen and MG de Kruif 
both stressed the role of trust among the military forces involved in the cooperation. They 
even went so far as to state that even though political agreement on cooperation might be 
achieved between partners, for the military forces involved it is necessary to have faith in 
each other and to be able to trust each other. This is a “bottom-up” requirement from the 
military side. If the political top-down guidance and the bottom up requirement do not 
match, or the military do not have faith in each others’ capabilities, professionalism and 
freedom of action, the cooperation is not likely to succeed66.  
A different mechanism involving trust is that states need a certain “minimum level” 
of trust in the potential partner(s). It does take a long time, and preferably a previous 
successful cooperation to come a level of trust allowing a deeper integration. A breach of 
trust will have long lasting effects on the perceived reliability of a potential partner67.  
The fourth factor concerns risk management. Strictly speaking this is both a technical 
factor and a factor pertaining to content. Cooperation does in almost all cases lead to a form 
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of compromise and a favourable outcome is therefore not guaranteed. If a state considers 
cooperation, it must therefore have a reasonable chance that the compromise is still better 
than what otherwise could reasonably be expected. It other words: it has to deliver results. 
States do have a tendency to prefer a “certain” national solution above a “possible” 
multinational result, even if the national solution would mean less production in absolute 
terms. Since all states make this judgement, the added insecurity increases and the necessary 
“win-win-situation” becomes less likely68.  
Summing up, a variety of hampering factors was recognized by the interviewed 
officers. Among these factors, trust and sovereignty play an important role but so does the 
national domestic interest in protecting autonomy and political accountability for military 
actions. To which extent can a state be trusted if governments change or popular support 
forces a government to change political course? The findings support the mechanism 
described in chapter three on the relation between domestic political accountability and IDC. 
The interview results furthermore show that although IDC is almost perceived as “standard” 
at lower working levels, at the military-strategic and political level it is debatable and 
controversial. It is still seen as second option compared to a national solution. 
5.4 Analysis  
The intent of this chapter was to achieve a better insight into the motives and mechanisms 
behind IDC and thus a better insight into especially the role of trust and sovereignty at the 
political-military level. How far and in what ways do these influence decision making on 
IDC? 
 States have a wish to maintain their independency and autonomy. The extent to which 
this affects and limits the possibilities for structural permanent cooperation is higher than 
expected. Despite very high pressure on defence budgets and increasing costs, states are very 
reluctant to give up their balanced, complete defence organizations. Furthermore one would 
expect that the practice of multinational operations would lead to a closer non-operational 
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cooperation. States revert to international cooperation in the form of standing units only out 
of necessity. And even if they manage to create a working system, states include mechanisms 
that allow strictly national operations.  
 A second observation is that, with the exception of a few areas, almost all fields are 
in principle open for cooperation. This seems to be contradictory to the first observation that 
states wish to maintain their autonomy. A possible explanation is that the boundary for what 
is an “acceptable” form or area is influenced or determined by the political choice of whether 
a state chooses to have full control over a very small defence structure, or less control over a 
larger, but shared, capability.  
When states choose, or see themselves forced, to cooperate they seek cooperation 
with reliable partners. They furthermore prefer a system for the cooperation that has proved 
to work. Limiting the numbers of partners and choosing “like-minded” partners are other 
ways of controlling the risk.  
 Thirdly, although political control over the armed forces is a basic principle in 
western societies, it is a considerable weakness when considering IDC. This manifests itself 
in the implementation of national laws and caveats. Furthermore, governments might change 
political character and decide to change decisions or preferred partners and coalitions. 
Without political integration, military integration will be less likely to succeed. In the 
absence of a coherent view and policy, IDC solely based on achieving savings and 
rationalized self interest is likely to be limited to non-controversial areas such as transport or 
logistics.  
Trust as factor is more complicated to evaluate than autonomy. Previous successful 
cooperation certainly helps to build trust between states. Also the membership of the same 
organization, like NATO, can help. It is however no guarantee that two states trust each 
other. A breach of trust, for example by not delivering promised contributions, can have a 
very negative impact on the status of a cooperation partner. Most likely the cooperation will 
not end, but the partner will be less attractive in future projects.  
On the other hand it is possible to be a trustworthy partner even when making use of 
caveats or other restrictions. States have an understanding of that, since they might be 
required to act in the same way on another occasion. Timely notification and good 
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communication can remove at least some of the frustrations with cooperation partners. Not 
surprisingly, states have much to gain from being reliable and predictable partners.  
Trust, although in a different form, plays a role in the “bottom-up aspect” of IDC. It is 
not enough to have political “top down” guidelines. The people that actually have to 
implement the cooperation, the military at tactical and technical level, need to trust each 
other as well. This becomes visible through a shared level of professionalism and willingness 
to take risks. When military forces at that level have different rules or permission on what is 
acceptable this undermines the willingness to cooperate and the cooperation will not 
continue in the long term. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The first conclusion is that IDC has to lead to clear added value in order to prevail against 
the many difficulties surrounding IDC. Currently, the most important added value is budget 
savings, as a result of increasing costs and decreasing budgets. IDC can lead to savings in the 
purchase of defence equipment, provided states are willing to accept compromises and 
reduce protection of their national defence industries. The formation of multinational units 
solely based on budget arguments is not likely to succeed. 
 Secondly, states do wish to maintain control over the actions of their military forces 
and want to reserve the right to decide on participation in military actions. This complicates 
the formation of collective multinational units and formations. In cases where multinational 
formations have been created, diverging views on “ad bellum” and “in bello” decisions can 
lead to erosion of the collectiveness. A shared common security policy, or even better, 
political integration based on a common view will enhance the chance of successful IDC. In 
the absence of such integration, partners will always have to face the possibility that a state is 
not willing to participate in using the multinational unit. 
 The main reason for states to be reluctant in committing to multinational cooperation 
in the form of standing units or formations, at least between NATO countries, seems to be 
the domestic political accountability and support. The use of multinational units in 
operations depends on the political approval of all participating members. Since this is not 
guaranteed, multinational units have to be organized in a sub-optimal way. Essential 
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elements have to be kept under “own” control, enabling strictly national operations, or with 
absence of one or more partners. Politically lesser sensitive areas, like logistics, have a better 
chance of success.  
 The mechanism is different with multinational materiel cooperation projects, which 
leads to the third conclusion. Materiel cooperation will most probably only achieve a 
considerable benefit if states are willing to accept compromise solutions. The presence of a 
lead nation or main contractor offers smaller partners the opportunity to participate in large 
programs and achieve considerable benefits in the form of financial savings or 
interoperability. This comes however at the “cost” of making the important choice to be 
connected to this main partner over a long time. This choice has to be in line with the states’ 
long term security policy. 
 Fourthly, it would be a step too far to state that there is a general lack of trust in other 
states when it comes to IDC. There can however be observed a scepticism towards 
international cooperation as such, since it means compromising and dependency. Trust is 
built by bottom-up acceptance and willingness to share risks. Top down, trust is mainly built 
by reliability and successful previous cooperation. The psychological component of 
cooperation and dependency should not be underestimated. Trust is a catalyst. Absence or 
breach of trust is difficult to overcome.  
The findings of chapter five indicate that sovereignty and trust are indeed factors that 
can contribute to the explaining limitations of IDC. Trust and sovereignty are interlinked. 
Internationally, one can never be sure an IDC partner state will indeed fulfil its obligations. 
National political reasons can prohibit states from engaging in too restrictive forms of 
cooperation and encourage them in keeping their options open. As a result, IDC becomes 
organized sub-optimally since the remaining partners have to build in the capability to act 
independently. 
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6. Cooperation in IR theory; motives and mechanisms 
The intent of this chapter is to analyze the role of trust and sovereignty as described in 
IR theory and to scrutinize how well the empirical findings fit to more general interpretations 
regarding cooperation identified by IR theory. Chapter five indicated that domestic political 
factors have a significant impact on IDC. This factor will therefore be taken into account 
separately. Three important theoretical works on international relations, each from a main 
approach within IDC, will be used as reference to assess the findings and  
First, a short general description of states and their relations will be presented in order 
to place IR theory in perspective. This is followed by three sections, each analyzing classic 
works of recognized scholars of IR: Waltz, Keohane and Booth and Wheeler on the factors 
trust and sovereignty, placing the empirical findings in a theoretical perspective. This will be 
followed by a section on domestic influence in international relations. Finally, the 
conclusions will be presented.  
6.1  States and their relations69 
Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the state-system has gradually become the 
global “standard” way to organize our world and society (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003). States 
can internally be organized in different ways70, but in general they all have the basic internal 
tasks of providing security, freedom, order, justice and welfare for their inhabitants. 
Externally, states are considered to be sovereign; politically independent of all other states. 
States are the entities that organize life internally as well as internationally. 
                                              
69
 State: A form of human association distinguished from other social groups by its purpose, the establishment of order and 
security; its methods, the laws and their enforcement; its territory, the area of jurisdiction or geographic boundaries; and 
finally by its sovereignty (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011).  
70
 f.e. republics, dictatorships, democracies, monarchies, one-party democracies, theocracies, etc..  
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IR studies how states interact and aims to understand the reasons why states act as 
they do and to explain the mechanisms of interaction and preferably link undertaken courses 
of action to achieved outcomes. It explores motives, actions and results (ibid.).  
IR scholars have also given considerable attention to competition and cooperation 
between states. Often they have done so emphasizing different core values, different 
scientific methods and different disciplines. Jackson and Sørensen recognize four main 
theoretical traditions within IR: Realism, Liberalism, International Society and International 
Political Economy. The boundaries are diffuse and views can overlap (ibid, p. 68).  
  
The first three will be used in relation to cooperation in IDC. 
6.2 Cooperation in IR 
Realism, especially neo-realism, seeks general patterns and laws governing 
international relations, against the background of anarchy. National security, power and state 
Illustration 6.1: International Relations according  
to Jackson and Sørensen 
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survival are the prime goals for states and there is no higher authority above the state. The 
general setting in international relations is one of conflict and competition, not cooperation. 
States act out of self interest, which can also mean that practical outcomes of state actions 
trump principles and earlier agreements. Within realism, states can cooperate, but they will 
do so only out of self interest.  
International Society focuses on human beings and their political values. As in 
realism, anarchy is the as general background for state relations, but International Society 
emphasizes general accepted rules of behaviour as tools to regulate interstate behaviour. 
State sovereignty, security and order are basic values. These can be achieved through 
agreements and cooperation with states and international institutions. Contrary to realism, no 
“general laws” are present. The actions of states are a result of the actions of men and 
women: thoughts and actions of people shape reality. Cooperation of states is the cooperation 
of humans.  
Liberalism within IR takes a generally positive and optimistic view on interstate 
relations. Economic interdependency and peaceful cooperation will lead to progress and 
security. In order to achieve security, co-binding international organizations such as NATO 
play an essential role71 (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 133). Anarchy does not necessarily 
mean conflict and also a legitimate authority can exist in international relations. Peace, 
cooperation and progress between democracies are not only possible, but likely. 
6.3 Realism: cooperation by necessity 
In “Theory of International Politics”, Waltz, explains general principles of state 
behaviour (Waltz, 1979). This work has become highly influential when it comes to 
describing general principles of behaviour that govern relations between states in an anarchic 
international system. Waltz is considered to be “...the leading neo-realist thinker.” (Jackson 
& Sørensen, 2003, p. 84). The background for his study is the Cold War and a bipolar world.  
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 Co-binding = locking states together through binding agreements 
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Waltz claims that nations theoretically could be much better off than they achieve in 
reality. Cooperation and the division of labour and tasks would enable a better “total” 
common outcome and states could enrich themselves more than they actually do. This 
division of labour could actually go further than the production of goods, but could include 
“…some of the tasks they perform, such as political management and military defence.“ 
(Waltz, 1979, p. 105). Two mechanisms prevent a deeper and better cooperation. Firstly, 
when states cooperate, they are more preoccupied in achieving relative gains, than absolute 
positions. “Who gains more?” is more important than “Will both of us gain?” (ibid, p. 105). 
Second, states are afraid of becoming dependant on other states. The more a state specializes, 
the more it has to rely on others (Waltz, 1979, p. 106). Reliability means weakness.  
Waltz emphasizes competition in the relations between states. Cooperation plays a 
role when it comes to stabilizing the inherently anarchistic system. A key position is given to 
“the balance of power”. Factors leading to a better chance of success, which in Waltz’ view 
is defined as “…preserving and serving the state”  (ibid, p. 117), include: 
− A smaller number of states in a system increase the chance for success.  
− In anarchistic “surroundings”, similar units co-act. 
− Individual power and influence improve a states’ position and increase the chance of 
success within cooperation. A more powerful state can “afford” mistakes. Smaller 
states have to be right all the time. 
− The chance of successful cooperation is enhanced with the presence of a “leader”. 
 
Concerns about the loss of autonomy are the second reason that states do not 
cooperate as much as would theoretically be possible, when only looking at “profit”. The 
more a state specializes, the more it has to rely on other states to supply materials and 
services that it cannot provide itself. States however do not like being in a position of 
increased dependence where they become dependant on other states. With the background 
that the states’ first and foremost task is to provide security to its people, one of the least 
likely areas to develop cooperation and specialization is therefore the cooperation between 
the military forces of different states. Military spending is the insurance premium for 
maintaining autonomy. 
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Military cooperation can however take place, and even successfully, in fear of a 
common enemy. “Alliances are made by states that have some, but not all of their interests in 
common.” (ibid, p. 166). When states pool their resources in such a way, they do so based on 
a common interest, but they run the risk of ending up with the lowest common denominator 
as basis for their actions. Thus the alliance can become weaker. Furthermore internal alliance 
politics can surface. Even the allegiance and loyalty of member states can be used to pressure 
other member states and gain individual benefits.  
Sovereignty and anarchy are two sides of the same coin. The consequence of 
maintaining individual sovereignty is collective anarchy. But even in such a system states 
can succeed in cooperating. Collective international efforts and common projects are needed 
in order to solve some of the world problems like poverty or the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. A necessary prerequisite in Waltz’s analysis is however the presence of a leader, a 
powerful and dominant state72.  
At first glance, a number of Waltz’s findings seem to be in line with the empirical 
results described earlier in this study. On the other hand is Waltz’s general assumption on 
competition between states, far from how many describe the current security-relation 
between European states. Western states, and for sure not those allied in NATO, do not pose 
a serious threat to each other. Caution should therefore be applied in projecting Waltz’ 
general “laws” of interstate relations to IDC.  
Four elements can contribute to explaining IDC as studied. Firstly, states can 
cooperate on even on defence, but it comes at the cost of dependence. When states face a 
common enemy and they can ally with a friendly partner, this is an acceptable price to pay. 
Many western countries have done so during the Cold War by allying with the US against the 
Warsaw Pact. The cooperation-dependence relation was also a part of the empirical findings 
and a serious impeding factor when considering IDC.  
A second important recognition is that states could actually achieve a more efficient 
organization when they specialize, but that the need for autonomy and sovereignty prevent 
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 For Waltz this was obviously the United States 
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such a specialization. This supports the findings from chapter five as described in paragraph 
5.3.2: “states want to be able to act independently”. Third, presence of a leader can facilitate 
cooperation, provided the smaller states are willing to accept its leadership. The EPAF F-16 
cooperation is an example of such a form of cooperation. Finally, too large numbers of 
participants are likely to complicate cooperation.  
6.4 Liberalism: cooperation by choice 
Robert Keohane is considered a main contributor to a more liberalist line of thinking, 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 50), although he builds explicitly on realistic theory as well 
“…and goes beyond it” (Keohane, 2005, p. X). In After Hegemony, Cooperation and discord 
in the world political economy, he discusses how economic cooperation between states can 
take place in world politics in the absence of hegemony. “States intend to achieve wealth and 
security for their own people and search for power as means to these ends.” (ibid, p. X). 
Contrary to Waltz, Keohane claims that cooperation is also possible without one strong 
leader-state, using international regimes and organizations.  
Keohane distinguishes clearly between harmony and cooperation. Harmony is the 
absence of disagreement. If there is harmony, states do not have to cooperate since their 
interests or actions do not have negative impact for others. Cooperation is necessary when 
states pursue a line of action that has, or is perceived to have, negative effects on other states. 
States have to adapt their policy or actions through a process of negotiation in order to 
achieve a situation that is acceptable for the involved parties. Cooperation does not imply the 
absence of conflict. Cooperation is a reaction to conflict or a potential conflict.  
Cooperation between states is possible, also in the absence of one dominating power. 
Positive factors enhancing the chance of success are (amongst others): 
− the presence of complementary interests 
− states have to balance short term and long term goals 
− states have to expect a reasonably positive outcome 
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− satisficing73 prevails above optimizing; accepting an outcome that answers to 
expectations is “good enough” and optimizing is often not necessary 
Cooperation between states is negatively influenced by the following factors: 
− The pursuit of flexibility can be self-defeating. Sometimes it is better to share 
information and accept obligations that restraining one’s own freedom of action. 
Not sharing information and keeping one’s options open can be 
counterproductive. 
− States have to be aware of their goal and they have to share this with their 
possible partners. Even if actors have the same goal they can fail to achieve 
cooperation if they are not aware of each others’ intent. 
− State sovereignty prevents states developing patterns with legally binding 
agreements as within a single state. Sovereignty limits enforceability of 
agreements. Instead, attempts to “enforce” agreements often lead to increasing 
political differences.  
− Division of responsibilities within one government or state can work negatively. 
If negotiations in complex matters are dealt with by several institutions of the 
same government, this will often mean that one of these will have to “give in”, 
standing as a bureaucratic loser. These will be unlikely to be willing to bear the 
cost of the cooperation and can even “sabotage” the whole effort. 
− If states intend to cooperate in order to achieve a “collective good”, which they 
cannot achieve alone, they have to be perceived as a serious and responsible 
partner. States that have acted as “free-riders” or promise-breakers will be less 
likely to achieve cooperation and their goals.  
Concerning trust and sovereignty, Keohane concludes that states have much to gain 
from being reliable partners. “A reputation as an unreliable partner may prevent a 
government from being able to make beneficial agreements in the future.” (ibid, p. 258). 
                                              
73
 Searching until a course of action is found that is at least at the satisfactory level.  (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 6) 
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Reputation is however not enough. States have to be willing to share high value information 
with intended partners so these can assess their intentions. International regimes can facilitate 
this process. 
Keohane’s findings largely support the empirical findings from the earlier chapters. It 
is interesting is that from a more liberal point of view, it remains necessary to give up (parts 
of) state sovereignty and parts of your flexibility if you really want to achieve results by 
international cooperation. State sovereignty as principle is undisputed, either as end or as a 
means. It can however be in the states’ best own interest to give up some of the flexibility 
provided by sovereignty. “Maintaining unrestricted flexibility can be costly, if insistence on 
it makes a government an undesirable partner for others.” (ibid, p. 259). The inverted 
consequence is that the more you cooperate, either by choice or by necessity, the more 
sovereignty you must be willing to give up.  
The implications for IDC are considerable. Either a state takes IDC seriously, at the 
cost of independence, or you hold to independence and have to limit the ambition and 
expectations regarding IDC. Furthermore, international cooperation is usually not a one-time 
happening, but often a series of occasions. Keohane’s theoretic analysis confirms the 
importance of being a trustworthy partner when engaging in international cooperation, as 
concluded from the examples in the chapter four and five. Withdrawing from cooperation 
might lead to short term gains, but the price is one’s trustworthiness in a next round of 
negotiations or cooperation. 
6.5 International Society: trust as a tool 
Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler have investigated the roles of fear, cooperation and 
trust in international politics. They did so by studying the concept of the "security 
dilemma”74 (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). They intend to explain actions from an individual 
state perspective. Giving a relatively important role to trust and fear within international 
relations also implies that they do not support a strictly rational approach to the mechanisms 
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 The security dilemma is the phrase used to describe the mistrust and fear which is the inevitable consequence of living in 
a world of sovereign states. The “dilemma” element describes that the same weapons methods and actions used to defend a 
state can be perceived as aggressive by the opponent and in that way increase insecurity (Booth & Wheeler, 2008) 
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of interstate behaviour. They give considerably more importance to the human factor in 
international relations. The actions of states are often the result of actions and initiatives by 
individual human beings.  
Booth and Wheeler come to the conclusion that international cooperation is 
structurally fragile. They name six contributing factors75 of which two are important for this 
study.  
− Rational egoism. “Cooperation cannot survive, and indeed flourish, if it is based 
on no more than rational egoism.” (ibid, p. 131). Without at least some shared 
values, cooperation is difficult to sustain.  
− Lack of communication between states can be a significant source of failure. 
Specifically named are “…effective signalling, transparency and reassuring 
words”. (ibid, p. 135)  Booth and Wheeler specifically discuss this related to 
“great powers”, but communication between lesser states can be equally 
problematic.  
On trust and sovereignty 
An essential factor in overcoming fear and in international cooperation, and therefore 
the key element of Booth and Wheelers’ study, is trust76. Their study investigates if and how 
trust is the mechanism that can overcome the security dilemma and enable cooperation. The 
absence of trust among states can lead to security competition like for example an arms race.  
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 Rational egoism, future uncertainty, ambiguous symbolism, ideological fundamentalism, great power irresponsibility and 
communication 
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 Working definition of trust according to Booth and Wheeler: “Trust exists when two or more actors, based on the mutual 
interpretation of each others’ attitudes and behaviour, believe that the other(s) now and in the future, can be relied upon to 
desist from acting in ways that will be injurious to their interests and values. This minimalist conception of trust can be 
contrasted with a maximalist one where actors mutually attempt to promote ach other’s interests and values, including in 
circumstances that cannot be observed. For trust to become embedded between political units, it is necessary for positive 
relationships between decision makers to be replicated at the inter-societal level, and vice versa, through a mutual learning 
process. Trusting relationships of either kind are made possible by the following linked pairs of properties: a leap in the 
dark / uncertainty, empathy /  bonding, dependence / vulnerability and integrity / reliability.” (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 
230) 
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There is however always the dilemma of how to interpret the actions and rhetoric of 
other states. Can the other be trusted? “…by committing to trust, actors expose themselves to 
severe costs if they are betrayed.” (ibid, p. 231) . On the other hand:” Familiarity would 
breed trust, and when this becomes embedded trust, the pernicious consequences of security 
dilemma dynamics would be transcended” (ibid, p. 173). Trust, in their analysis, is not the 
way to solve the security dilemma, but to overcome the dilemma. They recognize that it is 
very difficult, but not impossible, to overcome mistrust and even old animosity. 
Booth and Wheeler recognize four necessary elements or attitudes necessary to 
achieve trust among political entities. The first of these is a willingness to investigate new 
possibilities and to accept uncertainty. Changing one’s mind about a certain group or 
potential cooperation-partner is the first step when considering cooperation. Obviously the 
difficulty of this step varies with the image one has of the potential partner. In cases of like-
mindedness and good or neutral feelings it is easier to consider such a change than it is with 
former enemies.  
The second facilitator to building trust is the capacity to empathize with the potential 
cooperation partner. “…a capacity to empathize with the fear and suffering of one’s 
adversaries is a critical precondition for building trust.”(ibid, p. 237). This factor is 
especially important when engaged in reconciliation efforts after conflicts, but certainly also 
has a role when considering cooperation in other fields, like joint projects in which every 
partner has its own specific interest.  
The third element is accepting the vulnerability following from harm that others can 
inflict on you. In fact you calculate they will not use the opportunity and capability they gain 
by reaching an agreement with you. An interesting question is which safety margin you build 
into your position. Building in a high safety margin can be counter-productive when it comes 
to building trust. It can also lead to less result and therefore have a negative impact on the 
possible gains for oneself. 
Fourth and finally, partners are expected to behave with integrity and reliability. The 
partners need to have confidence that the other partner will do what is “right”. Reliable and 
honest behaviour will lead to a reputation of trustworthiness. In international relations this 
can be a lengthy process. It will be complicated by the fact that state-representatives can 
 82 
change because of internal political reasons like elections. A second hampering factor can be 
diverging views, for example by different representatives, from the same state, leading to 
doubt about the actual position77. 
Although Booth and Wheeler see a much closer relation between human interaction 
and state interaction, they do share the view that international cooperation is difficult and 
many pitfalls exist in achieving long-lasting and structural cooperation. The value for this 
study is their concept of trust. Trust is an essential element in for all international 
cooperation and they emphasize that “…the history of politics among nations can yet be 
written in terms of choice rather than tragedy, community rather than anarchy, trust and 
cooperation rather than fear,…” (ibid, p. 297). Trust is a tool than can be used to live with 
uncertainty.  
This mechanism was also observed when investigating trust empirically: although all 
states under circumstances can be forced to withdraw from their obligations, defence 
cooperation was deemed most successful when cooperating with like-minded partners and 
building on successful previous projects. Cooperation was also more likely to succeed when 
it was based on a common vision and values, and not solely on short term self-interest. 
6.6 National political influence and domestic factors 
Chapter five indicated that also domestic factors have a considerable impact on IDC, mainly 
through democratic political mechanisms. Governments are kept responsible for the actions 
of their armed forces, which increases reluctance to become dependant on other states or to 
accept multinational command. Can this mechanism be explained using IR theory?  
Realists have been criticized for their assumptions and following theories on 
international relations and state behaviour. In World Politics78 Helen Milner comments on 
the general neglect of domestic factors influencing international state behaviour (Milner, 
1992).  According to Milner the main goals for cooperation mainly depend on internal 
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 One can think of different delegations, negotiating on behalf of the same government, but having diverging opinions.  
78
 Quarterly Journal of International Relations 
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domestic factors. Varying domestic social groups have reasons to influence the goals for the 
international cooperation their state engages in. Domestic political factors influence a state’s 
international goals and behaviour. “In general, the problem with assessing relative national 
gains is that one has to add up the net benefits for different domestic groups to arrive at a 
national assessment” (ibid, p. 491). As discussed earlier, national security policies and the 
domestic economic situation do impact on defence cooperation. Models developed and used 
by most realist scholars do not include domestic influence and therefore less suited to 
describe international behaviour and cooperation. IDC depends on national politics as well.  
Liberalist scholars in general include domestic factors in their explanation of a state’s 
international relations and actions (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 133). Nations consist of 
many different groups of people, which have different ties and different interests. Because 
individuals and groups within a state can have different interests, the state-leadership has to 
balance these various interests, they are not completely free to act. This results in 
compromises that influence the state’s international behaviour as well.  
Keohane recognizes that After Hegemony lacks a theory on how domestic politics and 
international institutions connect. He “…did not know how to incorporate a sophisticated 
domestic politics theory into my analysis…” (Keohane, 2005, p. XIII).  He recognizes this as 
a considerable weakness. Domestic factors do play a role in international cooperation in 
general and he credits Helen Milner for linking domestic and international politics. 
Domestic factors and national politics play a less prominent role for International 
Society theorists than they do for Liberalists. “They are not inclined to investigate the 
domestic aspects of foreign policy.” and “…draw a firm line between international relations 
and the internal politics of states.” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 167). In this approach of 
IR, international politics and politicians are not closely related to national politics. The basis 
for policies and decisions is rather found in values and norms than in domestic internal 
interests.  
6.7 Conclusion  
The intent of this chapter was to analyze the role of trust and sovereignty in IR theory 
and to scrutinize to which extent the empirical findings fit to more general interpretations 
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concerning cooperation identified by IR theory. So which meaning do the theoretical findings 
have for this study? Within IR there is no unified coherent view on international cooperation. 
States can and do cooperate, but out of different motives and with different mechanisms. All 
three presented schools have useful elements.  
Looking at this theoretical level has provided indications that certain empirical 
findings on IDC are supported by general theoretical insights regarding international 
cooperation. IR theory confirms the inverse relation between sovereignty and cooperation 
found during the empirical research. The more you cooperate, the more sovereignty you 
probably will have to give up. If one wants to remain completely flexible, one should not 
cooperate. Cooperation means you adapt to each other and therefore will have to make 
compromises. In terms of IDC: increased cooperation makes the armed forces dependant on 
other states. It can however enable you to benefit from extra capabilities that can become 
available through international cooperation.  
Second, Booth and Wheeler’s observations on trust in international cooperation are, 
with certain modifications, in line with empirical observations from IDC. States can be 
forced to come to cooperation and give up parts of their autonomy. If they have to do so, they 
would better do it with states that have proved themselves reliable partners in the past. For 
IDC there is however a complicating factor: although military forces and their state level are 
closely connected, they are not identical. This can result in two-level negotiations and 
situations, where the military are able and willing to cooperate, but the governmental level is 
not. This situation is inherent to western democratic systems. Political reliability and stability 
will strongly influence the prospect of successful IDC.  
 A further insight concerning the choice of partners is that IR-theory confirms that it is 
wise to choose like-minded partners, sharing political values. This seems to be an obvious 
statement, however in the search for saving budgets one has to realize that it is better to 
achieve an enduring cooperation with fewer saving, than to choose for potential high savings 
in a cooperation that will not last. Cooperation in known institutions such as within NATO 
furthermore enables the significant advantage of enhanced interstate communication at both 
military and political levels. 
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 It is reasonable to assume that IDC is, at least partially, regulated by the same 
mechanisms that influence general international relations. Theorists from IR do not agree on 
the role of domestic factors, especially national political factors. For IDC however, empirical 
findings indicate that these factors are very relevant. Internal political stability makes a 
partner more trustworthy and therefore more attractive as partner. Shared political values 
further enhance the chance of successful cooperation, decreasing the chance that a state has 
to abstain from using an international organized capability for internal political reasons. 
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7. Conclusion & consequences 
In this thesis I have studied whether IDC is a possible answer to some of the challenges that 
states and their military forces face upholding their defence capabilities, or whether IDC in 
itself can cause new challenges or problems.  
Most states in Europe have passed the point of no return when it comes to IDC and it 
seems that it will be around for quite some time, because “…for small and medium-sized 
states the possibility of keeping a national balanced military force that is recognized as 
credible is diminishing quickly.” (Ulriksen, 2007, p. 67). This development has been 
remarked in the states involved. It has inspired an impressive number of initiatives, co-
operations, joint projects and declarations. Still, no overarching plan, either political or 
military, exists to coordinate all these efforts and make best use of the available resources. 
Despite the apparent urgent need to come to a solution, there are factors that prevent better 
structured, deeper and easier international cooperation regarding defence. 
 This thesis investigated if the following question: Can a lack of international trust 
and the need for upholding national sovereignty explain limitations and problems of 
International Defence Cooperation? Do other factors have to be taken into account?  
Conclusion 
The first question investigated is if IDC in practice is really so difficult. In order to establish 
that IDC indeed is a challenging undertaking, to justify the research question and to achieve 
insight into what challenges it faces, a model presented by the Norwegian Defence Staff was 
used. The model uses three perspectives to organize factors influencing IDC: the security-
political-, the economical- and the military perspective. The question whether IDC is indeed 
a problem could be answered positively: IDC is perceived as difficult and faces serious 
challenges and limitations in all three areas. This initial analysis furthermore indicated that 
IDC has become more normal at the tactical level then it is at the political-strategic level.  
What is the relation between armed forces and state-sovereignty? Armed forces are a 
part of the executive power of the state. In western democracies they receive legitimacy for 
their existence and actions through political decisions. Their actions are the actions of the 
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state. The relation between military forces and their states gives sufficient reason to believe 
that mechanisms influencing international politics will also influence interaction between 
military forces from different states. If armed forces of different states cooperate 
multinationally, they voluntarily reduce their sovereignty; they can be placed under the 
command of a coalition or a different nation or they otherwise have to compromise their 
complete independence from other states. Sovereignty and trust are relevant factors to 
consider and can have substantial influence on the sort of defence cooperation, the partner-
choice and the success of the cooperation.  
States do already cooperate on defence. The question is therefore relevant if cases of 
IDC indicate how states solve the sovereignty issue and in how far they trust each other. 
Analysis of the founding-documents of nine cases of IDC indicates that states indeed include 
mechanisms or guarantees to control the balance between sovereignty and dependency. In 
order to reserve or revoke their control, more recent MoU’s, TA’s and other agreements 
contain clauses and articles allowing states to withdraw or to abstain from participation. 
Sovereignty, in the form of deciding nationally on the use of military capabilities, remains an 
important consideration in IDC.  
So what effects do trust and sovereignty have on defence cooperation? Incidents 
concerning the cooperation-initiatives indicate that trust does play an important role in 
coming to cooperation, or determining if an initiative will be continued. The document 
analysis alone did however not provide sufficient insight on the role of trust. Furthermore, 
IDC is a political issue, or it can become one when national interests, policies or 
opportunities conflict with earlier agreements. The academic debate on the NORDEFCO 
cooperation is quite interesting in this context, especially since the relation between 
dependency and savings is discussed. 
In order to achieve insight in trust and the mechanisms behind IDC, interviews were 
conducted. The results confirm that states on one side are looking for new or better forms of 
IDC, mainly to save costs, but on the other hand are reluctant to do so. Sovereignty and trust 
play an important role, but not in the sense that the military do not trust each other. States 
have to very careful, or mistrustful if one chooses blunter wording, regarding other states 
because of the political nature of IDC.   
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Besides investigating sovereignty and trust, this thesis kept the question open whether 
other factors play a significant hindering role for IDC. An important reason for states to be 
reluctant in committing to multinational cooperation in the form of standing units or 
formations is caused by domestic political accountability and support. Political authorities 
wish to maintain control over the actions of their national military forces. Therefore they 
reserve the right to decide on participation in military actions. This complicates the 
formation of collective multinational units and formations. As a consequence, there is reason 
to be modest regarding promises and expectations concerning the possible gains of IDC. It is 
not a quick-fix or easy solution to budgetary restrictions. 
In cases where multinational formations already have been created, diverging views 
on “ad bellum” decisions can lead to erosion of the collective effort. The use of multinational 
units in operations depends on the political approval of all the participating members. Since 
this is not guaranteed, multinational units have to be organized in a sub-optimal way. 
Essential elements have to be kept under national control, enabling strictly national 
operations, or coping with the absence of one or more partners. Politically less sensitive 
areas, like logistics, have a better chance of success. Consequently, when states choose IDC 
as a means to uphold their defence capability, they have to realize it comes at a price. They 
have to be willing to accept compromises and become dependant on others. 
Theory from International Relations was the third way to investigate trust and 
sovereignty. Are the findings on trust, sovereignty and domestic political accountability in 
line with existing theory from IR and do they have a more general value for IDC? IR offers 
no unified coherent view on international cooperation, but indicates that the findings on trust 
and sovereignty in IDC are not unique for defence cooperation alone. Increased cooperation 
leads to less sovereignty.  
If one has to maintain complete flexibility and autonomy this means one should not 
cooperate. In terms of IDC: increased cooperation makes the armed forces dependant on 
other states. It can however enable a state and its armed forces to benefit from extra 
capabilities that can become available through international cooperation. This gives reason to 
assume that the empirical findings on the reluctance to give up sovereignty are not restricted 
to the studied cases alone, but can be applied to other cases and forms of international 
defence cooperation as well. Building flexibility into IDC, for example by organizing 
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multinational units in modules, can be a prudent way to limit dependence. It also reduces the 
synergetic effects of such cooperation. 
The theoretical perspective on trust as confirms empirical observations from IDC. If 
states decide to cooperate, they will always become dependant. There is no way to remove 
this consequence. IDC therefore erodes state sovereignty. When cooperating, states will 
benefit from choosing partner-states that have proved themselves reliable partners in the past. 
Secondly, although military forces and their national governments are closely connected, 
they are not identical. This can result in two-level negotiations and situations, where the 
military are able and willing to cooperate, but the government is not, or vice versa. This 
situation is inherent to western democratic systems.  
To achieve successful IDC, states depend on a reputation as trustworthy and 
politically reliable partners. Future IDC projects have a better chance of success if they build 
on known relations between previous partners and use proven mechanisms.  Furthermore, a 
good internal national coordination between the military and the political authorities in a 
state, so both levels have the same intent and information, will considerably enhance the 
chance of success in IDC. 
Combining document analysis, interviews and theory from International Relation has 
shown that, in general, European states seem to be willing to cooperate on defence matters. 
There can however also be observed a political scepticism towards international cooperation 
as such, since it means compromising and losing parts of sovereignty. Trust is built by 
bottom-up acceptance and willingness to share risks. Top down, trust is mainly built by 
reliability and successful previous cooperation. The mental component of cooperation and 
dependency should not be underestimated. Trust can be a catalyst, leading to synergetic 
effects. The absence or breach of trust is difficult to overcome and hard to compensate.  
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Annex A: Abbreviations 
1 GNC   First German / Netherlands Corps  
ABNL Admiral Benelux (Navy cooperation the Netherlands & Belgium) 
ACI   Army Cooperation Initiative (Norway & the Netherlands)  
AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System (also known as E-3A 
Cooperative Programme) 
BENELUX Belgium, the Netherlands & Luxembourg 
C2 Command and Control 
C-17 Boeing Globemaster III 
DOI Declaration of Intent 
EATC European Air Transport Command 
EEAW  EPAF Expeditionary Air Wing 
EPAF   European Participating Air Forces (F-16 cooperation) 
ESDP    European Security and Defence Policy 
EU   European Union  
F-16   General Dynamics Multirole jet fighter aircraft 
FULLCOM  Full Command 
HAW   Heavy Air Wing (C-17) 
IDC   International Defence Cooperation 
IR   International Relations 
ISAF   International Security and Assistance Force (Afghanistan) 
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding 
NAF   Norwegian Armed Forces 
NAMO  NATO Airlift Management Organization 
NASAMS  Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System 
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NAMSA  NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency  
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
NRF   NATO Response Force 
NH-90   NATO Helicopter (type 90) 
NORDEFCO  Northern Defence Cooperation 
NRF   NATO Response Force 
OPCON  Operational Control 
RPV   Remotely Piloted Vehicle 
SAC   Strategic Airlift Capability  
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SFOR   Stabilization Force (Bosnia) 
TA   Technical Agreement 
TACOM  Tactical Command 
TACON  Tactical Control 
TOR   Terms of Reference 
UKNL AF  United Kingdom-Netherlands Amphibious Force 
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UN   United Nations 
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Annex B: Illustrations 
3.1   Factors influencing IDC (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2011) 
4.1  NATO command relationships (Koninklijke Landmacht, 2000, p. 197) 
6.1  IR according to Jackson & Sørensen (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 6) 
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Annex C: Interviewed officers 
Major General T.H. Knutsen, Norwegian Defence Staff 
Adviser International Engagement 
Major General Tom Henry Knutsen is adviser international engagement for the Norwegian 
Chief of Defence. This new post was created in 2011, in order to achieve a coherent 
approach to international relations on behalf of the Norwegian Defence Staff and the 
Norwegian Ministry of Defence. MG Knutsen has held a number of international posts and is 
a graduate of the U.S. Air War College. He was the Norwegian Defence Attaché in 
Washington from 2006 to 2010.  
 
Brigadier B.T. Solberg, Norwegian Ministry of Defence 
Deputy Director Department for Security Policy FDII 
The Department of Security Policy is responsible for the handling of questions of security 
policy as well as for the Ministry’s international activities and external relations in the field 
of security policy. The department is responsible for the development and coordination of the 
Ministry’s policy regarding bilateral, regional and international security policy questions, as 
well as for the development of defence-related cooperation with allied and partner countries. 
Furthermore, the department takes care of Norway’s defence policy relations with NATO, 
EU, UN and OSCE. From 1993 to 1999 Brigadier Solberg served in the operations and 
planning braches at the combined NATO and national Norwegian headquarters in North 
Norway. He has been with the Ministry of Defence since 2001. He was appointed Brigadier 
and Deputy for Security Policy Department in 2008. 
Major General M. de Kruif 
Deputy Commander Royal Netherlands Army 
Currently MG de Kruif is deputy commander of the Royal Netherlands Army. He is a 
graduate of the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (USA) and holds a Master’s 
degree in Strategic Studies. He was responsible for the formation, training and preparation of 
Dutch forces designated for participation in ISAF. March 27th, 2008 he was promoted to 
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major-general. From October 2008 to November 2009 he commanded the Regional 
Command South, ISAF. with over 45.000 soldiers from the US, the UK, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Australia, France, New Zealand, Singapore, Romania and Slovakia. 
He has a special interest in international cooperation and preparing Dutch officers, soldiers 
and units for international operations.  
Commodore F. Sijtsma 
Assistant Chief of Staff International Defence Cooperation, Netherlands Defence Staff 
The office for International Defence Cooperation (IMS) supports the Chief of Defence, his 
deputy and the Netherlands defence Staff regarding international defence cooperation. The 
office expresses national Dutch policy in international organizations and is the prime point of 
contact for international affairs in the Defence Staff. Commodore Sijtsma has extensive 
multinational operational experience. He commanded naval operations in the Caribbean, 
during several NATO missions and commanded the Dutch Naval Forces Caribbean, the 
Coast Guard Dutch Antilles and Task Group 4.4. Commodore Sijtsma is in office as ACOS 
International Defence Cooperation since May 28th, 2010. He is chairman of the working 
group investigating increased IDC for the Netherlands’ Defence Forces as part of the current 
restructuring project. 
 99 
Annex D: Interview questions  
The intervews were conducted as open conversations. The interviewees had a high influence 
on the topics and the direction of the conversation. To avoid unnecessary diversions and 
focus the attention, the following questions were used. Several questions were however a 
natural part of the conversation and therefore not specifically asked as separate question. 
A. General Introduction. 
1. About International cooperation in general: 
a. The Netherlands / Norway are internationally orientated. Can you name the 
most important reasons to conduct IMC? 
b. Which are currently the most important projects? 
c. Do these live up to the expectations? 
2. In which form do the Netherlands / Norway benefit from IMC? (Increased output? 
Budget savings) 
3. Under which conditions can IMC become a success?  
4. Are all military area’s / fields open for cooperation?  
5. In which way do political considerations influence IMC? 
a. Top down / bottom up 
b. Life expectancy government vs. duration projects 
c.  
B. Specific on IMC and Budget savings: 
Especially driven by budget restrictions and increasing costs, IMC is often named as one 
solution. Theoretically one could imagine a completely “international” defence force or f.e. 
task specialization.  
1. In which way does IMC lead to savings?  
2. What “limits” IMC in such a form ? 
3. Which mechanisms are used to achieve substantial savings? 
4. Are there any specific conditions necessary under which conditions can IMC lead to 
savings?  
5. Strictly economically, it would make sense to leave national defence. Benefits of 
scale would facilitate lower costs in the purchase of equipment and role specialization 
 100 
would most probably be more cost effective. Why don’t we all pool the defence 
budgets and organizations? 
6. Alliance theory states one of the reasons to cooperate is that in that way states are 
able to afford systems / achieve effect they cannot achieve alone. Collective goods 
theory.  (Example AWACS planes). Defence materiel prices are increasing 
significantly. Would such an “AWACS” solution be an option for capabilities that are 
today still “national”.  
a. Examples: Submarines? Fighter planes?  
b. Why not? 
c. How to avoid “free riders” & “bandwagoning” 
 
C. Specific questions on “Autonomy” / Sovereignty 
1. In which way does the need for autonomy and control influence the possibilities with 
IMC? 
2. Can one IMS deliver substantial savings without giving up autonomy or sovereignty? 
3. Would you / NLD / Norway be willing to accept less national control if it would lead 
to increased international / combined output, even it means giving up full control? 
Political acceptance?  
4. If yes: do you exclude certain areas or capabilities?  
5. Can you react on the following statement? 
“Without political international integration, military integration will not work.” 
D. Trust & Control 
When states have to cooperate, especially on sensitive issues, this requires trust.  
1. How does one build up trust internationally? And militarily? 
2. Defence cooperation project do often exceed the lifetime of a government. Which 
consequences does this bring?  
3. The more important a field or capability is for a state, the less it will be inclined to 
leave it to a partner. In your opinion, are there limitations what states will be willing 
to trust to others? Examples? 
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E. Success and failure 
1. Can you define or give examples of “failure” in IMC? Which reasons can you name? 
2. What are the most important reasons why IMC does not deliver the expected results? 
 
F. Which documents regulate NLD Security and Defence policy and in which way are 
these translated into actions or measures? 
G. Success or failure (and why)? 
− EPAF / F16 
− NORDEFCO 
− 1 GNC 
− Army Cooperation Initiative 
− Strategic Airlift Command 
− AWACS cooperation.  
− (UK/NL amphibious force) 
 
Can you give examples of failures in defence cooperation? What were the reasons? 
 
 
